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The focus of this issue of the Loyola Lawyer is on the Law School 
curriculum. The lead article provides a brief, but balanced, overview of 
key historic developments in law teaching as well as an explanation of 
notable techniques currently in use. While many changes in legal 
education have occurred during the past ten years, there exists the 
possibility of far more dramatic change in the not too distant future 
because of several national studies that are currently in progress. 
Speaking broadly, these studies are expected to provide a detailed 
examination of the processes and products of legal education. They 
promise to clarify the transition from student to lawyer. Three examples 
will illustrate the work being undertaken. One project is examining the 
teaching processes in law school and the effects of these processes on 
students' professional expectations, their attitudes toward the profession 
and the law, and the development of skill and role competencies. 
Another study is examining the practicing bars' views of legal education, 
including its relationship to career development. Particular attention 
will be given to the role that law schools have had, and should have, in 
the development of skills important to the practice of law. Finally, 
another project is exan1ining the development of law teaching materials -
especially, the casebook - in historical context and will review the 
current state of the art and conclude by making recommendations for the 
direction that experiments with the production of instructional material 
ought to take over the next few decades. 
The impact, if any, of the information and recommendations produced 
by this research and analysis remains to be seen. The important point to 
note is that, for the first time in the history of American legal education, 
a significant effort is being made to introspectively analyze the 
contribution that law schools make in the training of lawyers. It will be 
some time before this work is completed. Once published, time will be 
needed to critically evaluate these studies with a view toward examining 
the need for change in curriculum and methodology. It may be that the 
fierce debate sparked by the introduction of the case method a century 
ago will be insignificant when compared to the debates which 
undoubtedly will follow the completion of these important works. 
1 
Modern Legal Education 
Curriculum Responsive to a Changing Society 
The past decade has been a period of 
unprecedented growth and adaptation in 
the field of legal education. American 
law schools have responded to the 
demands of over a n1illion college 
graduates annuallYi an increasing 
percentage of whom are now seeking 
post~graduate and professional 
education. The law schools have also 
felt a need for bridging the 
ever-increasing gulf between 
conventional academe and a rapidly 
changing urban society. Add to that the 
professional requirements of the 
practicing legal community and it 
creates a situation significantly 
different than most law schools were 
originally designed to serve. 
Law schools in general have 
responded to their changing role in a 
variety of ways. Legal education has 
undergone a remarkable transition to 
fill the gap caused by the "legal 
explosion11 of the 1960's whose 
after-shocks are still shaking the 
foundations of most institutions. The 
principle modus operendi adopted by 
many schools to meet the challenge of 
modem legal education has been a 
revamping, updating, and re-directing of 
curriculum, often in a haphazard 
manner. Loyola Law School has 
certainly not been immune to the 
pressures of modern legal education, but 
we have attempted to plan curricular 
changes with a policy of controlled 
growth. 
Until the early 1960's, Loyola offered 
only a basic core curriculum of son1e 30 
courses. The type and number of classes 
available have increased steadily, and 
today we have developed more than 100 
required and elective courses and have 
established a growing reputation as a 
leading exponent of urban law. Practical 
and theoretical courses are blended to 
enhance the law student's ability to 
develop professional skills based upon 
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sound legal reasoning. Professors 
approach students in their first year of 
law school using the Socratic method 
-which increases logical and thorough 
understanding of legal principles. In 
later semesters, this basic fran1ework is 
expanded through the student's choice 
of a wide variety of elective options 
which can focus on specialized areas of 
law. 
Students are required to successfully 
complete 8 7 total semester units in 
good standing in order to graduate from 
Loyola, of which the majority - 51 
units - are in required courses. These 
required classes constitute a "core 
curriculun1" which is designed to give 
the student a solid foundation in the 
major areas of the law, on which the 
student may build in the later years of 
law school and for the entirety of his or 
her professional career. The required 
curriculun1 consists of Civil Procedure, 
Civil Procedure Workshop, Contracts, 
Crin1inal Law, Property and Torts, all 
taken during the first year; 
Constitutional Law, Corporations, 
Criminal Procedure and Evidence in the 
second year; and Legal Ethics and a 
course of a statutory nature, typically 
taken during a day student's third and 
final year. The evening student must 
take the san1e required courses, but 
they are spread over a four-year period. 
The ren1aining 36 rmits of electives, 
often times involving specialization in a 
particular area of law; are chosen with 
the assistance of a faculty advisor who 
is assigned to the student at the outset 
of the first year of studies. 
Loyola Law School is dedicated to 
giving its students a comprehensive 
education so that its graduates may 
function effectively as attorneys in 
today's society. 
Loyola has been fortunate to have a 
Jesuit heritage which forms the 
foundation for outstanding legal 
education. Permeating the curriculum 
and practical applications of theory is an 
ethical standard, a system of values and 
moral order. This heritage is the quality 
which makes Loyola Law School special 
in comparison to other law schools. 
This heritage is also evident in the 
fact that Loyola is one of the oldest law 
schools in Southern California, and is 
the direct descendant of St. Vincent's 
College, the first institution of higher 
education in the area. It was founded as 
the St. Vincent School of Law and began 
offering evening classes in September 
1920. This post-World War I period 
marked the end of a turbulent era in 
American legal education which 
brought about the acceptance and 
institutionalization of a revolutionary 
method of teaching law- the "case 
method." 
Legal education in America, in its 
recognizably nwdem form, began with 
Dean Christopher C. Langdell's 
introduction of the "case method" to 
the Harvard Law School in 1870. 
Langdell pioneered the concept that the 
law was a science, that this science 
consisted of relatively few principles, 
and that these principles could be 
apprehended through reading the 
judgements of appellate courts, which 
contained the laboratory materials of 
the law. 
The "case method" transforn1ed an 
historically diversified entre into the 
legal profession and generated heated 
controversy and extensive debate an10ng 
the law fa cui ty of the era. Over the 
years, the so-called "Harvard system" of 
legal education went through fierce 
criticism and gradual change through 
partial accommodation to the views of 
critics. Much of the developn1ent of 
American legal education in this 
century can be traced in terms of the 
spread of the "case method" and its 
subsequent adoption by most law 
schools as the accepted mode of 
teaching. 
Faculty at The St. Vincent School of 
Law embraced the 11case method'' 
approach as a commitn1ent to the most 
contemporary teaching techniques of 
the period. The school also 
implemented a course of instruction in 
11Legal Ethics" as early as 1920, thus 
anticipating a rapidly developing trend 
in legal education today. This 
progressive tradition has been 
continued as the hallmark of Loyola 
Law School's innovative method of 
teaching throughout its 58-year history. 
The historical roots of legal education 
extend, of course, much further back in 
time. Law, as one of the three oldest 
learned professions, along with 
n1edicine and theology, serves as an 
excellent illustration of the old adage, 
"The more things change, the more 
they stay the same." It is, perhaps, 
curious to note that law schools today 
are again stressing n1any of the practical 
applications of legal training which 
have been the primary source of 
teaching since the time of Socrates. 
For thousands of years students of the 
law were, in essence, serving an 
apprenticeship to a learned master of 
the already con1plex body of 
socio-religious dogma, codes, family, 
property, and trade laws which 
abounded in the ancient Mediterranean 
cultures. A student learned the law 
through experience, not formal 
education. Babylonian, Egyptian, and 
Greco-Roman law were interpreted and 
transmitted through the generations not 
by way of a university classroom, but 
through the close personal training of a 
seasoned legal practitioner who guided 
the aspiring law student in the practical 
and philosophical aspects of the law as 
applied to their society. This was 
particularly true until the time of the 
Romans who made one of the first 
successful efforts to construct a system 
of law which was codified and binding 
on the citizens of the Roman En1pire. 
During the Middle Ages, the volume 
of written legal documents and 
precedent were compiled and codified in 
the Canons of the Church. Monastic 
training developed the forn1al, 
theoretical legal education which 
gradually evolved during the 
Renaissance period into a formalized 
curriculum. Classroon1 lecture and 
theoretical knowledge superceded the 
practical method of teaching which the 
legal profession had relied upon for 
centuries. 
The Anglo-American tradition of 
Common Law promulgated a system of 
legal education which stressed lecture 
and legal points of issue based upon a 
strictly theoretical classroom approach. 
Legal education in An1erica became 
probably the only professional training 
which was entirely based upon theory, 
with little or no practical linlzs to the 
outside world. American law schools 
during the 18th through mid-20th 
centuries graduated lawyers who had 
never entered a courtroom. It was felt 
by many in the field during this period, 
and to son1e extent even today, that this 
purely academic approach to legal 
education was proper and necessary to 
in1part a sound basis for legal analysis to 
a student. After graduation, the new 
attorney was traditionally hired by a 
law firn1 and "learned the ropes" of 
practical legal areas through n1any years 
of gradual training by other members of 
the firn1. 
Times have changed, however, and 
we have witnessed a transition in legal 
education which has come nearly 
full-circle in the past decade. Law 
school teaching methods in general 
have begun to emerge from pure 
theoretical models back into the "real 
world" of current social issues and 
practical training for the students in 
specialized areas of the law. 
This has become a sensitive and vital 
area of legal education today, partly 
influenced by the large number of law 
graduates, and the selective tendency of 
law fim1s to hire and train only the top 
students in each class. Also, with 
pressure being exerted by various 
professional organizations and 
prominent members of the bench and 
bar calling for more accountability on 
the part of law schools to provide not 
only the theoretical base of knowledge 
but also to insure the practical 
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competence of graduates1 law schools 
are faced with an ever-increasing share 
of responsibility in the training of 
students and practicing men1bers of the 
legal profession to help them keep pace 
with rapidly changing realities. 
This emerging trend in modem legal 
education is evidenced at Loyola Law 
School in three areas1 each of which 
represents novel means of increasing 
relevancy of the curriculum. These 
three areas are: Trial Advocacy Courses; 
Clinical Programs; and a practicum of 
Continuing Legal Education. 
The Trial Advocacy Courses involve a 
simulation of an actual courtroom 
situation1 in which the student can 
practice actual trial techniques. Loyola 
offers two different forms of Trial 
Advocacy as a basic teaching and 
learning tool for advanced students. 
Civil Trial Advocacy and Criminal Trial 
Advocacy are three-unit courses offered 
in multiple sections1 each of which 
allows a ma:ximun1 enrollment of only 
25 students in order to keep the 
student/faculty ratio as low as possible. 
Students are assigned individual cases 
for sin1ulated litigation which allows 
them an opportunity to analyse all 
aspects of a trial
1 
including pre-trial 
motions1 trial briefs1 the voir dire, 
settlement negotiations1 jury selection 
tactics1 opening statement1 order of 
proof, direct and cross exan1ination, 
closing arguments, and sentencing. 
Student perfom1ances in these 
sessions are video-taped using a 
remote-controlled video/audio recording 
and playback system. This allows the 
professor and fellow students an 
opportunity for close scrutiny and 
critique of each studenes courtroom 
manner. 
Professors in the Trial Advocacy 
classes also have the option of using 
outside guest lecturers in areas such as 
commercial litigation, n1alpractice1 and 
other specialized fields of law. In 
addition to refining practical courtroom 
skills1 the courses also raise questions of 
ethical conduct by counsel. This 
practical learning experience builds 
upon a thorough theoretical education 
in the classroom; the traditional courses 
in Civil Procedure, Crin1inal Law, and 
Evidence are each prerequisites to the 
Trial Advocacy classes. The Trial 
Advocacy Courses themselves devote 
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It's a Grand Old School - Much of the history and development of legal curriculum at 
Loyola Law School was centered in this structure on Grand Avenue in Los Angeles which was 
occupied by the Loyola University School of Law from 1933-64. 
additional time to theoretical matters 
which, when combined with the 
direction of the Trial Advocacy faculty 
and the audiovisual critique capability1 
produce a high degree of personal 
improven1ent and professional 
motivation in the students. 
A factor which makes this course 
particularly beneficial for the student, 
and a feature which is indeed unique to 
Loyola is that a student who has 
completed the Criminal Trial Advocacy 
course is eligible to participate in the 
District Attorney Practicun1 offered 
through the Clinical Program; this 
allows for even further melding of the 
theoretical and practical aspects of legal 
education. 
The concept of Clinical Education is 
now a decade old and still rapidly 
developing. Some controversy is 
generated in the legal community and 
amongst law school faculty about this 
pragmatic approach to legal education1 
but it is clearly a significant trend in 
nwdem law curriculun1 which is being 
evaluated and adopted on a large scale 
across the United States. 
Loyola Law School provides its 
students not only with a theoretical 
understanding of legal concepts, 
principles, and precedent but 
encourages them, through an extensive 
clinical program1 to utilize this 
knowledge. 
The Loyola Law Clinics is an 
in-house proprietary law firm founded 
in 1969, and staffed by five full-time 
attorneys who carry the title of Clinical 
Professor. Several specialized 
practicums have been developed at the 
in-house clinics, with the principle 
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concentration devoted to law as applied 
to an urban society. Students in other 
clinical programs are placed with 
various state and federal public law 
offices, judges, and administrative 
agencies. 
Students enrolled in the Law School's 
clinical program receive a wide variety 
of exposure to the practical side of law. 
Students handle assigned cases and 
represent clients in judicial proceedings. 
Some students also receive limited trial 
experience under supervision of an 
attorney as permitted by the State Bar's 
Rules for the Practical Training of Law 
Students. 
Students are given a choice of wide 
variety of clinical experiences. The 
Loyola Law Clinics expose students to 
the general practice of law in a 
comn1unity setting. Clinics in Trial and 
Appellate Advocacy enable students to 
participate in civil and criminal trials 
and in law reform litigation. 
Administrative Agency Practicun1s give 
students an opportunity to participate 
in the legal work of important 
govemn1ent agencies from the inside. 
Judicial Clerkship practicums offer the 
student the opportunity of working 
closely with a judge in order to gain a 
greater appreciation of the court system 
from the judge's perspective. All of 
these progran1s are tied to acaden1ic 
components in which the legal and 
social significance of the student's 
experiences can be discussed and 
analyzed. 
Loyola Law Clinics by area of 
concentration are: 
A. CIVIL LAW 
Civil Division, Loyola Law Clinics 
Civil Litigation 
Consun1er Affairs 
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles 
(Alvarado) 
Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles 
(East Los Angeles) 
Prisoners' Rights and Remedies 
(Frontera) 
B. TRIAL ADVOCACY 
County Public Defender 
District Attorney 
Drug Abuse Division, Loyola Law 
Clinics 
Federal Public Defender 
Juvenile Division, Loyola Law 
Clinics 
Los Angeles City Attorney 
State Public Defender 
U.S. Attorney 
C. ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY 
California Department of 
Corporations 
Environmental Protection Practicun1 
Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission 
Securities Exchange Comn1ission 
Small Business Adn1inistration 
D. LOCAL GOVERNMENT 
Civil Practice 
Governmental Internships 
E. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
Court of Appeal 
Los Angeles Municipal Courts 
Los Angeles Superior Courts 
U. S. District Court Magistrates 
It is anticipated that as our urban 
society changes and new needs are to be 
confronted, other clinics n1ay be 
established and operated for the benefit 
of the community and as part of the 
educational process for the student. 
These innovative forn1s of curriculum 
have been specifically oriented to the 
law student. However, various 
professional organizations and law 
schools have begun to recognize the 
crucial need for providing effective 
Continuing Legal Education for the 
practicing bar. For this reason and as a 
service to its own alumni, Loyola Law 
School initiated an extensive CLE 
program in Fall 1975 which offers 
courses of timely and growing concern 
to the legal profession. New issues in 
California general corporation law, real 
property, lessor remedies, architects and 
engineers liability, criminal statutes and 
other developing legislation, have been 
the topics of the Loyola CLE program to 
date. 
Continuing Legal Education is seen as 
an area of growing concern within the 
profession. The ABA, various State 
Bar's, and other professional 
organizations have engaged in a serious 
debate on the direction and purpose of 
CLE. Most call for a greater emphasis 
on CLE to keep the practicing bar 
informed concerning the constant, if not 
overwhelming revision of federal, state, 
and local statutes and regulations. 
Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren E. 
Burger recently focused on the need for 
CLE to overcome the alleged 
incon1petence of American trial 
advocates. In whatever way the 
continuing debate is resolved, it has 
become clear that CLE will become an 
integral part of many law school's 
curriculum as a commitment to modern 
legal education. 
Loyola's CLE program is helping to 
meet the needs of hundreds of attorneys 
and alumni in Southern California by 
offering both Spring and Fall classes. It 
is planned that the Loyola CLE program 
will continue to grow in the future as a 
vital part of its educational mission. 
What else does the future hold in 
store for Loyola Law School, and how 
will the school's approach to legal 
education and curriculum change with 
the tin1es? These are questions of vital 
interest as new innovations already on 
the horizon indicate the increased use 
of computerized legal classroom 
training, the effects of declining college 
enrollment, the ever-changing role of 
the bar and the judiciary, and other 
significant social variations which will 
alter the traditional faculty/student 
relationship, perhaps as drastically as 
the innovation of the "case n1ethod" a 
century ago. 
How well Loyola Law School faces up 
to these demands on modern legal 
education will determine the future 
growth and development of the Law 
School. Loyola has already responded by 
building a core curriculum of traditional 
courses supplen1ented and balanced by a 
full range of courses which allow the 
student to blend the theoretical with 
the practical. Future adaptations will be 
carefully evaluated and skillfully 
implemented as the school attempts to 
fom1ulate plans for the direction of 
private legal education at Loyola in the 
1980's and beyond. 
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Alu~nni News and Notes 
A Toast to the Bar-Alumni enjoy the festivities at the second annual reception for graduates 
who passed the California Bar Examination in 1977. The event was hosted by the Loyola 
Law School Alumni Association on February 23 at the Los Angeles Athletic Club. 
Bar Examination 
Results 
Results of the July 1977 State Bar 
Exan1ination indicate that Loyola Law 
School ranked fourth among all 
California law schools in the percentage 
passing rate of those taking the exam for 
the first time. Test data released by the 
Comn1ittee of Bar Examiners in San 
Francisco show that 240 out of 283 
Loyola Law School graduates taking the 
test passed. This is a success rate of 
84.6% 1 a slight improvement over our 
score the previous year at this tin1e. 
Loyola graduates scored considerably 
higher than the statewide average 
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passing rate of 54.6%, and were nearly 
10% better than the 75.4% first-time 
passing rate of the other 14 ABA 
accredited law schools in California. 
Still unofficial statewide rankings of 
the top ten law schools show 
McGeorge School of Law 91.5% 
87.2% Whittier College 
Boalt Hall 
Loyola 
usc 
UCLA 
UC Davis 
Stanford 
U of San Diego 
Santa Clara 
85.9% 
84.6% 
81.9% 
78.1% 
77.5% 
77.1% 
76.0% 
74.9% 
The Committee of Bar Examiners of 
the State Bar of California announced in 
December that a record 7,246 
candidates took the General Bar 
Examination and that 3,958 passed the 
first time. 
A reception was held February 23 at 
the Los Angeles Athletic Club for the 
Loyola Law School graduates who 
passed the California Bar Exan1 in 1977. 
Some 125 new Loyola Lawyers enjoyed 
the annual festivities hosted by the 
Alun1ni Association. 
Alumni Banquet 
The Loyola Law School Alumni 
Association sponsored the Annual 
Alumni/Advocates Dinner Dance on 
Friday, April 14 at the Beverly Wilshire 
Hotel. Over 200 Law School alumni, 
friends, students, and guests attended 
this gala event which for the first time 
featured a combination of the 
traditional Alumni Association and The 
Advocates banquets. 
Cocktails and dinner were served in 
the Le Petit and Le Grand Trianon 
rooms, followed by awards cerenwnies 
honoring several distinguished members 
of the Law School community. 
Master of Ceremonies for the evening 
was Laurence G. Preble '68, president of 
the Alumni Association, the Invocation 
was given by Rev. Donald P. Merrifield, 
S.J., president of Loyola Marymount 
University, and Frederick J. Lower, Jr. 
'64, dean of Loyola Law School, 
presented a profile of the Law School 
today and future plans for development. 
Co-Honorees for the dinner were Fritz 
B. Bums, president of Fritz B. Burns and 
Associates of Los Angeles, and 
Theodore A. (Ted) Von der Abe '31, 
chairman of Von's Grocery Company, El 
Monte. Both of these men have a long 
association with Loyola Marymount 
University, and serve as Honorary 
Co-Chairmen of the Loyola Law School 
Board of Visitors. 
Two faculty men1bers received special 
recognition for 25 years of service to 
Loyola Law School. Professors 
Clemence M. (Clem) Smith '48 and 
Lloyd Tevis '50 were honored for their 
years of teaching a generation of law 
students. 
The Annual Alun1ni Association 
Award was also presented at the dinner 
to Michael F. Newman '78, past Student 
Bar Association - Day Division 
President, for service to the Law School. 
Serving on the Alunmi Association 
Board of Governors Special Events 
Committee which coordinated the 
dinner were David M. Finkle '67, 
chaim1an, and Alvin N. Loskan1p '68. 
A Class Operation -Members of the Loyola Law School Class of 1952 Reunion Committee 
celebrate their 25th Reunion at the Century Plaza Hotel 01;1 October 28, 1977. From left are 
Richard L. Franck, Kenneth W. Gale, Thomas E. Garcin, Alan R. Woodard, chairman, Merle 
H. Sandler, and J. Marshall Schulman. 
Summer of '42 -Members of the then Loyola University School of Law, Class of 1942, 
gathered for their commencement photograph 35 years ago. Back row (from left) John W. 
Olson (deceased), Frank E. Gray (deceased), C. Arthur Nisson, J. Judson Taylor, Richard A 
Fitzgerald, Jack Carlow, and Warren E. Slaughter. Center row, Carl M. Gould, Robert Nibley, 
Howard J. Deards, David S. Smith, Arthur B. Willis, and Mark Mullin. Front row, Edwin 
Greenberg (deceased), Clement F. Von Lunenschloss, John K. Bennett, and John J. Conroy. 
Together Again - The Class of '42 gathered again for their 35th Reunion recently, and at-
tending the event were (from left) Arthur B. Willis, chairman of the Reunion Committee, 
Clement F. Von Lunenschloss, Carl M. Gould, Professor J. Rex Dibble, Robert Nibley, Jack 
Carlow, C. Arthur Nisson, and Mark Mullin. 
Class of 1952 Reunion 
The Loyola Law School Class of 1952 
held their 25-Year Reunion on October 
28, 1977 at the Century Plaza Hotel in 
Los Angeles. Alan R. Woodard, 
chairman of the Reunion Con1mittee, 
announced that a class gift amounting 
to $16,500 was pledged at the event to 
establish an endowed class fund for the 
Law School. 
Assisting Woodard in the successful 
quarter-century celebration attended by 
29 alumni and guests were Odra L. 
Chandler; Richard L. Franck, Kenneth 
W Gale, Thomas E. Garcin, Merle H. 
Sandler, and Marshall Schulman. 
Also at the reunion were Dean and 
Mrs. Frederick J. Lower, Jr. '64, Professor 
and Mrs. f. Rex Dibble, Professor 
Clemence M. (Clem) Smith '48, Mrs. 
Sidney Morgan, forn1er Registrar at the 
Law School, and her husband, John 
Morgan. 
Class of1942 Reunion 
Law School alumni from the Class of 
1942 gathered at the California Club 
in Los Angeles on October 5 to cele-
brate their 35th Class Reunion. Arthur 
B. Willis, partner in the Los Angeles law 
finn of Willis, Butler, Scheifly, Leydorf 
& Grant, served as chairman for the 
Reunion Comn1ittee. Assisting Willis 
on the Reunion Con1mittee were Carl 
M. Gould and Robert Nibley, both 
with the Los Angeles firm of Hill, Far-
rer & Burrill. 
Classmates joining the organizing 
committee at the affair were Jack Car-
low, Deputy City Attorney, City of Los 
Angelesi Mark Mullin, attorney at 
lawi C. Arthur Nisson, Jr., partner in the 
hrm of Millet:, Nisson & Kogler, Los 
Angelesi and Clement F. Von 
Lunenschloss, attorney at law. 
Dean and Mrs. Frederick f. Lowe~ fr. 
'64 attended the banquet along with 
Professor and Mrs. f. Rex Dibble. 
The Class of 1942 has pledged over 
$9,000 to establish an endowed class 
fund at the Law School. It is planned 
that additional pledges and gifts will 
increase this endowed class fund in 
the future. 
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Legal Briefs 
1930s 
Hon. Walter S. Binns '39 is supervising 
volunteer attorneys (who practice in the 
Harbor area) now serving as judges potem in 
the Los Angeles Municipal Court, Division 
88 in San Pedro. Hon. Thomas W. LeSage '37 
has been assigned to handle civil jury and 
non-jury actions in the Central District 
Superior Courthouse. Hon. John A. Shidler 
'35 has been assigned to the Southeast 
District Superior Court, Norwalk. 
1940s. 
Hon. Thomas C. Murphy '40 has been 
assigned to the North Central District 
Superior Court, Burbank and Glendale. 
Hon. Burch Donahue '46 has been assigned 
to the Southwest District Superior Court, 
Torrance. Hon. Carroll M. Dunn urn '46 has 
been assigned supervising judge for the 
second year to the South District Superior 
Court, Long Beach. Hon. Ernest L. Kelly 
'48 has been assigned to the South District 
Superior Court, Long Beach. Hon. Robert 
C. Nye '48 has been assigned to handle civil 
jury and non-jury action in the Central 
District Superior Courthouse. He also was 
presented the Alfred J. McCourtney 
Memorial Award by the Los Angeles Trial 
Lawyer's Association at their annual 
installation dinner. Hon. Raymond R. 
Roberts '48 has been assigned to the 
Northwest District Superior Court, Van 
Nuys. Paul Caruso '49 has been elected 
president of the newly-formed 
Italian-American Lawyers Association. 
Justice Lynn D. Compton '49 has been 
elected installing officer for the Culver 
City Bar Association. Hon. Otto M. Kaus ·•49 
was the guest speaker at a seminar 
sponsored by the Planning and Training 
Division of the·Los Angeles County 
District Attorney's Office. Hon. L. Harold 
Chaille '49 has been elected presiding 
judge of the Imperial Municipal Court 
system. 
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1950s 
Jason J. Gale '50 has been installed as 
second vice-president of the South Bay Bar 
Association. Hon. Francis X. Marnell '50 
has been assigned to handle civil jury and 
non-jury actions in the Central District 
Superior Courthouse. Mark P. Robinson '50 
has received the An1erican Board of Trial 
Advocates "Most Outstanding Trial 
Attorney" award at the organization's 
annual dinner. He has also addressed the San 
Diego Lawyers Association on questions 
relating to Evidence Code Sec. 352. Hon. 
August J. Goebel '54, Los Angeles Superior 
Court, was among the roster of seminar 
panelists at the California Trial Lawyers 
Association in San Francisco. He has been 
assigned to the Southwest District 
Superior Court, Torrance. Hon. Eugene 
McClosky '51 has been assigned to handle 
civil jury and non-jury actions in the Central 
District Superior Courthouse. Hon. J. 
Wesley Reed '52 has been assigned to handle 
civil jury and non-jury actions in the 
Central District Superior Courthouse. Hill 
Sayble '57 addressed a luncheon meeting 
of the Lawyers Club on "Evaluation of the 
Profitable Case." Hon. Robert C. Todd '57 
has been appointed to the Orange County 
Superior Court by Governor Edmund G. 
Brown, Jr. In addition he has been appointed 
by the California Judges Association 
Executive Board to fill the unexpired term of 
Judge Robert E. Rickles, who was elevated 
to the Orange County Superior Court. Also, 
he has been appointed presiding judge of 
the Orange County Harbor Municipal Court. 
Daniel W. Holden '58 has been elected 
Director from the North Orange County 
Judicial District to the Board of Directors 
of the Orange County Bar Association. He 
has also been elected president of the 
Orange County Bar Association. Hon. Roy L. 
Norman '58, Rio Hondo Municipal Court, 
has been selected as secretary-treasurer for a 
new organization formed by the presiding 
judges of the Municipal Courts of Los 
Angeles County. The purpose of the 
organization is to solve the problems that 
mutually affect the individual court 
districts. Tom R. Breslin '59 has been 
installed as the first vice-president of the 
Glendale Bar Association. Robert R. 
Waestman '59 has recently been installed 
as secretary-treasurer of the Long Beach Bar 
Association. 
1960s 
Herbert G. Blitz '60 has been elected 
president of the Criminal Court's Bar 
Association. He also recently addressed 
new adrnittees at a seminar sponsored by the 
Criminal Bar Association on "Voir Dire 
and Jury Selection." Hon. PeterS. Smith '60 
was appointed presiding judge of the 
Superior Court, Juvenile and Mental Health 
Department, for a second year. Ralph W. 
Miller, Jr. '61 has been promoted to Senior 
Counsel in the corporate Law Department 
of Dar Industries, Inc. Loren A. Sutton '61, 
assistant district attorney of Santa Barbara 
County, was the master of ceremonies at the 
Board of Governors of Legal Secretaries, 
Inc. Loren Miller, Jr. '62 has been appointed 
to the Los Angeles Superior Court Bench 
by Governor Edmund G. Brown. He has been 
assigned to the East District Court, 
Pomona. Mary F. Beaudry '62 and Joanne S. 
Rocks '70 presented an estate planning 
seminar at the Loyola Marymount campus 
on March 8. Johnnie L. Cochran '62, 
criminal defense attorney, has been named 
"Criminal Trial Lawyer of the Year" for 
1977 by the Criminal Courts Bar 
Association. He has also been named 
assistant district attorney, the third highest 
post in the district attorney's office. John 
P. Killeen '63 authored "The 20-Day 
Preliminary Notice in Private 
Construction Work" in the August 1977 
issue of the L.A. Bar Journal. He authored 
"Owner Liability for Construction Costs" in 
the November/December 1977 California 
State Bar JournaL Frederick J. Lower, Jr. '64, 
Dean of Loyola Law School, has been 
selected as a Fellow by the American Bar 
Association and has been appointed to the 
newly formed Executive Committee of the 
Committee on Legal Education of the 
State Bar. James Krueger '65 has been elected 
president-elect of the Western Trial 
Lawyers Association; is the second lawyer 
in Hawaii to be inducted into the 
International Society of Barristers; and has 
been appointed to the Board of Barristers of 
the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. 
Joseph C. Battaglia '65 is the new first vice 
president of the Italian-American Lawyers of 
California. Patricia A. Lobello '67 has been 
elected treasurer of the Italian-American 
Lawyers of California. Lynne D. Finney '67 
is the fii:st woman to be appointed Director 
of the Office of Industry Development of 
the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, a 
regulatory agency for the savings and loan 
industry. W.C. Fields, III '68, the comedian's 
grandson, is the proud father of W.C. 
Fields, rv; who made his debut in September 
1977 at seven pounds and fourteen ounces. 
Wayne K. Lemieux '68 authored "Land Use 
Control by Utility Service Moratorium: 
The Wrong Solution to the Right Problem" in 
the November 1977 L.A. Bar Journal. 
Laurence G. Preble '68 was master of 
ceremonies at the Loyola Law School 
Alumni luncheon of the State Bar 
Convention. Benjamin Aranda III '69 has 
been elected president of the National La 
Raza Bar Association. He has also been 
elected Trustee of the L.A. County Bar 
Association. Kenneth Lee Chotiner '69 
spoke on "Handling the Defense of the 
Occasional Misdemeanor Case" to the 
Santa Monica Bay District Bar Association. 
Stephen D. Cunnison '69 has been 
installed as secretary of the Riverside County 
Bar Association. 
1970's 
John L. Guth '70 has opened his office for 
general practice in Yuba City. Joanne S. 
Rocks '70 and Mary F. Beaudry '62 
presented an estate planning seminar at the 
Loyola Marymount campus on March 8. 
Gary M. Ruttenberg '70 has announced the 
formation of the law offices Ruttenberg 
and Tanzman in Los Angeles. Cynthia M. 
Ryan '70 has been appointed to the 
position of vice-president and general 
counsel of California Life Insurance 
Company, a subsidiary of California Life 
Corporation. Stephen C. Taylor '70 has 
been elected treasurer of the San Fernando 
Valley Bar Association. Kathryn. Doi Todd 
'70 has been appointed assistant prosecutor 
in the district attorney's office. Gordon S. 
Benson '71 has announced the opening of his 
corporate law, securities regulations and 
civil litigation offices in Encino. John F. 
Sawyer '71 has been named new director 
of the Orange County Bm: Association's 
Lawyer Referral Service. Herbert F. Blanck 
'71 has been installed as first vice-president 
of Phi Alpha Delta, Los Angeles Alumni 
Chapter. Richard Douglas Brew '71 is 
engaged in International Business Law and 
Finance, the first to be based in London, 
England. Gary F. Overstreet '71 has been 
installed as marshall of the Phi Alpha Delta, 
Los Angeles Alunmi Chapter. Rosemary 
Garcia '72 has been nominated to the 
National Science Foundation's Committee 
on Science Education. Michael C. Mitchell 
'72 authored "Not Separate But Equal: 
Community Property and the 'Reformed' 
Marital Deduction" in October 1977 L.A. 
Bar Journal. Susanne C. Wylie '72 was one of 
the co-editors of the sympositun issue of 
the Los Angeles Bar Journal, September, 
1977. Mark P. Robinson, JL '72 
Thomas F. Coleman '73 was the main 
speaker at the January meeting of the Gay 
Law Students Union of Los Angeles. DL 
Selwyn Rose '73 addressed the California 
Attomies for Criminal Justice on ''A 
Psychiatrist Looks Back at the Attorney 
and the Judge Looks at Both." Carol E. Schatz 
'73 has been installed as the corresponding 
secretary for the Women's Lawyers 
Association of Los Angeles. David E. Tripp 
'73 was the first place winner in the Third 
Annual West Publishing Company 
Lawyers Art Contest. Mr. Tripp was the 
winner of the first contest held in 1975. 
Richard W. Wright '73 has been appointed 
assistant professor at Yeshiva University's 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New 
York. Keith G. Burt '74 has been elected 
treasurer of the Black Attorneys of San Diego 
County. Teresa P. Cark '74 has announced 
her association with Shepphird & DeGraw in 
Huntington Beach. Timothy D. Takata '74 
has authored his first novel, The Last Exam, 
a story of the making of a lawyer. Stephen 
A. McKee '74 has been appointed by City 
Attorney Burt Pines, assistant supervisor 
of the Van Nuys criminal branch. Ronald K. 
L. Collins '75 chaired a two-day 
constitutional law conference at 
Southwestern Law School. He is presently 
collecting essays for a forthcoming book. 
Carol S. Frederick '75 is the co-editor of 
the California Women Lawyers' Bulletin; and 
convention chairperson for the Women 
Lawyers Association of Los Angeles. Joanne 
Bockian '75 recently opened the firm 
Bockian & Hanifan. She was erroneously 
identified as James Bockian in the Winter 
1977 issue of the Loyola Lawyer. Our 
apologies to Ms. Bockian. Mark W. 
Gibbons '75 has announced his partnership 
in the fim1 of Billbray, Gibbons & Pitaro in 
Las Vegas, Nevada. Jeffrey G. Sheldon '75 has 
been elected secretary-treasurer of the 
Pasadena Young Lawyers. Jess J. Araujo '76 
has been elected vice-president of the 
Mexican-American Bm: Association. He is 
also searching for heirs in a $400,000 land 
dispute in Texas. Kathryn A. Ballsun '76 
authored the article "Laing vs. United 
States: A Hollow Victory for the Jeopardy Tax 
Payer" in the July/August 1977 Beverly 
Hills Bar Association Journal. Patrick L. 
Garofalo '76 has opened law offices in 
Beverly Hills. James R. Gotcher '76 has 
announced his association with David L. 
Shapiro, forming the fim1 Gotcher & Shapiro. 
The firm will emphasize immigration law 
and international business. Donald Peckner 
'76 has edited, in conjunction with I. M. 
Bernstein, Handbook of Stainless Steels. 
Donald is the associate editor for 
Encyclopedia of Engineering Materials eiJ 
Processes. Christopher Real '76 has 
announced his association with the firm of 
Morgan, Wenzel & McNichols in Los 
Angeles. Laurie J. Bernhard '77 has won 
second prize in the 1977 Nathan Burkan 
Memorial Competition. Her winning essay 
was entitled, "Infringements & Damages 
in Violations of Copyright Monopolies: 
Protection for the Musical Artist." Peter L. 
Clinco '77 has been appointed as assistant 
to the chairman of the Board of the 
investment banking firm of Cantor, 
Fitzgerald & Company. 
In Memoriam 
Condolences are extended for Robert D. 
Lynch '72 who was fatally injured by an 
intruder in his Pasadena home on February 
13, 1978. Mr. Lynch is survived by his 
widow, Heidi, two small children, and his 
brother, Patrick S. Lynch, a member of the 
Loyola Law School adjunct faculty. Mr. Lynch 
had been named as a partner in the firm of 
Agnew, Miller &_ Carlson, Los Angeles, 
effective January 1, 1978. Funeral services 
were held at St. Bede's Catholic Church on 
February 16, burial was at Holy Cross 
Cemetery. 
At the request of his partners, classmates 
and friends a memorial fund will be 
established. Additional information regarding 
this fund will be forthcoming. 
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Orange Grooves-Everybody had a good time at the banquet sponsored by the Orange 
County Alumni Chapter. The annual event honored six Loyola Law School alumni who are 
currently serving on the bench in Orange County. Dean Frederick J. Lower, Jr. '64 presented 
an informative overview on the current state of the Law School and future trends in legal 
education. 
Orange County 
Alumni Event at 
Country Club 
The Loyola Law School Orange County 
Alumni Chapter held their annual 
social event January 31, 1978 at the Big 
Canyon Country Club in Newport 
Beach. Forty-two alun1ni, along with 
spouses and friends, attended the event. 
Chairperson of the Orange County 
Alunmi Chapter,; Mrs. Sheila P. 
Sonenshine 70, served as n1aster of 
ceremonies for the proceedings which 
honored six Loyola Law School alun1ni 
for their service on the Bench in Orange 
County. 
Recognition was extended to the Han. 
Robert L. Corfn1an '39, retired Superior 
Court Judge; Han. Luis A. Cardenas '68, 
Municipal Court of the North Orange 
County Judicial District; Han. Samuel 
Riverside-
San Bernardino 
Alumni Event 
The Riverside/San Bernardino Alumni 
Chapter held a successful first annual 
alumni event at the Smugglers Inn, San 
Bernardino, on January 27, 1978. 
The banquet was attended by 20 
Loyola Law School alunmi and their 
guests. 
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E. Collins '51, West Orange County 
Municipal Court Commissioner; Han. 
John C. Teal'61, Municipal Court of the 
Central Orange County Judicial 
District; Han. Jan1es K. Turner '51, 
Superior Court; and Han. Robert C. 
Todd '57, recently appointed Superior 
Court fudge. 
Loyola Law School faculty and staff 
members attending the event included 
Dean and Mrs. Frederick J. Lowe~ Jr. 
'64, Professor George C. (Curt) Garbesi, 
Lola McAlpin-Grant, assistant dean for 
Student Services, and Joan Profant, 
director of Placen1ent. 
Working on the event's planning 
committee were Charles W. Garrity '61, 
Mrs. Elizabeth Y. Williams '70, Terrence 
M. O'Shea '76, Joanne S. Rocks '70, 
Burleigh f. Brewer '67, Marshall M. 
Schulman '52, Guillermo W. Schnaider 
'69, Caldwell R. Campbell '67, and 
Mark E. Minyard '76. 
Serving as master of ceremonies for 
the evening was the Han. J. Steve 
Williams '41, Superior Court Judge of 
San Bernardino County. 
Featured speaker for the event waS 
Loyola Law School Dean Frederick J. 
Lower, Jr. '64, who attended with his 
wife, Virginia. 
Planning the event were Philip B. 
Wagner '57, president of the alumni 
chapter,; and his committee which 
included Gerald 0. Egan '51, James L. 
Liesch '60, Justin M. McCarthy '53, 
Victor G. Tessier '54, and Judge 
Williams. 
Alumni Chapters 
Formation 
As reported in the Wmter 1977 issue of 
the Loyola Lawyer, 18 new Alumni 
Chapters have been organized within 
California in order to effectively unite 
Loyola Law School and its alumni in a 
working relationship. The respective 
chairpersons and their addresses were 
listed to facilitate your contact and 
involvement with the Alumni Chapters. 
A chapter has now been formed 
in the West San Gabriel Valley. The 
chairman is fohn H. Brink '58 of Irsfeld, 
Irsfeld & Younge~ 7060 Hollywood 
Boulevard, Suite 1011, Los Angeles, 
California 90028, (213) 466-4161. 
We now have more than 4,200 
men1bers of the Alumni Association. 
The Alunmi Chapters have been formed 
to increase communications and to 
organize various social, educational, 
and liaison activities within your 
communities. Your interest and 
participation are welcome. 
Alumni are now scattered throughout 
the United States; howeve:r; nearly 80 
percent of your classmates reside and 
practice in California. Following is a 
brief demographic profile of each 
chapter to acquaint you with the 
number of alumni in your area. 
Alumni Chapter 
261 Beverly Hills/Brentwood/ 
Westwood 
18 Central Coast 
38 Central Valley 
346 East San Fernando Valley 
129 East San Gabriel Valley 
210 Long Beach/San Pedro 
495 Los Angeles 
300 Orange County 
261 Pacific Palisades/Santa Monica 
71 Palos Verdes 
95 Riverside/San Bernardino 
70 San Diego 
90 San Francisco/Sacran1ento 
24 Santa Barbara 
265 South Bay 
40 Ventura/Oxnard 
294 West San Fernando Valley 
299 West San Gabriel Valley 
Legal Education: the Progressive Tradition 
Loyola Law School has established a 
reputation for excellence in many 
areas since our founding in 1920. We 
have been fortunate to have the op-
portunity and commitment to build 
a progressive tradition of academic 
and professional expertise during 
our 58-year history of service to the 
legal community. All of our stu-
dents, faculty, alumni, and staff 
have contributed in their own way 
to this fine and growing reputation, 
and the results are sell-evident. 
Each year Loyola Law School 
graduates consistently show better 
results on the California Bar Exan1 
than graduates of other schools. In-
deed, they receive ten percent 
higher passing average than oth er 
ABA accredited law schools in 
California. Did you ever wonder 
why? What is it that makes the 
Loyola Law trained attorney better 
than average ... the answer is sim-
ple. It is the Loyola Law School 
educational program. 
This program of teaching and 
learning is unique to our area. It is 
one which not only provides the 
comprehensive and indepth review 
of the law itself, but also em-
phasizes the practical aspects of the 
law by offering the student exposure 
to the law at work through a multi-
faceted law clinic program. 
In today's society much of the 
"law explosion" is related to the 
changing complexities of our urban 
centers and Loyola Law School has 
been and continues to be an urban 
law school, str essing the problems 
of the urban centers of California, 
the nation and around the world. 
It is the continuation and en-
hancem ent of these progran1s that 
keeps Loyola Law School in the 
forefront of legal education. The 
flexibility to change or add to the 
curriculum, the clinical program, 
the constant review of urban prob-
lems with the accompanying addi-
tion and/or deletion of course mate-
rial allows Loyola to provide its 
graduates with the adaptability to 
cope with these ever changing and 
challenging problems when entering 
the legal profession. 
The ability to meet these changes 
and challenges with viable educa-
tional programs now and in the fu-
ture will continue only with the 
support of the Loyola Law School 
alumni and friends . . . your unre-
stricted gift now to Loyola Law 
School will provide the support 
needed to continue and enhance the 
educational programs which make 
Loyola Law School an important 
force in legal education. 
A Guide to Tax 
Deduction and 
Charitable Gift 
Citations 
Citations of Authority 
The Federal government encourages gifts to 
schools, churches, hospitals, and other public 
supported charities such as Loyola Law 
School by allowing charitable deductions for 
a variety of gifts to non-profit institutions. 
Below is a listing of relevant court citations, 
Internal Revenue codes, Treasury regula-
tions, and revenue rulings directly relating to 
the various forms of charitable giving. 
We hope it will serve as a ready reference 
guide for your personal and professional con-
sideration. 
Cash - Deductible up to SO% of donor's ad-
justed gross income. IRC §170(b)(1)!A); Reg. 
§l.l70A-8. S-year carryover allowed for any 
"excess." IRC §170(d)(1), Reg. §1.170A-10(a). 
Securities and real estate held long-term {1 
year or longer) -Deductible at the full pres-
ent fair market value, with no capital gain on 
the appreciation. IRC §170(e). Deductible up 
to 30% of adjusted gross income. IRC 
§170(b)(1)(D)(i); Reg. §1.170A-8(d)(1). Five-year 
carryover allowed for any "excess." IRC 
§170(b)(I)!D)(ii). 
Under election, donor can increase ceiling to 
SO% of adjusted gross income (with a S-year 
carryover for any "excess") by making the 
same gift, but (I) reducing the amount of the 
deduction for all long-term property gifts dur-
ing the year by one-half of the appreciation, 
and (2) similarly reducing the deduction for 
long-term property gifts being carried over 
from either years. IRC §170(b)!l)(D)(iii); Reg. 
§l.l70A-8(d)(2). 
Held short-term (less than 1 year) - Deduc-
tion is for cost-basis. IRC §170(e)!1)(A). De-
ductible up to SO% of adjusted gross income. 
IRC §170(b)(l)(A). Five-year carryover allowed 
for any "excess." IRC §I70(d)!1); Reg. 
§1.170A-4. 
Tangible personal property (e.g., works of art, 
antiques, books) held long-term Reg. 
§1.170A-4 -Related Gifts: Deduction is full 
present fair market value, with no capital 
gain on appreciation, if use of the property is 
related to donee's exempt function (e.g., gift 
of painting to art museum or to school for its 
art gallery). IRC §170(e)!l)!B)(i). Deductible up 
to 30% of adjusted gross income. IRC 
§170(b)(l)(D)!i). Five-year carryover allowed 
for any "excess." IRC §170(d)!1). Deductible 
up to SO% of adjusted gross income (wi th 
five-year carryover for any "excess") if same 
election made as for gift of long-term secu-
rities or real estate, abovt;. 
Held short-term - Same as gifts of short-
term securities and real estate, above. 
Umelated Gifts: If the gift is wuelated to 
donee's exempt function, deduction is fair 
market value minus one-half of the apprecia-
tion. IRC §170(e)(1)!B)!i). Deductible up to 
SO% of adjusted gross income. IRC 
§170(b)!l)!A). Five-year carryover allowed for 
any "excess." IRC §170(d)!1). 
Bargain sales - Charitable deduction. 
Allowed for difference between fair market 
value and sales price for bargain sales for 
long-term securities and real estate. IRC 
§170(e)(2); Magnolia Dev. Corp., 19 TCM 934; 
Waller, 39 TC 665 (Acq.); Gladstein, (DC)68-1 
USTC 119197; Gamble (DC) 68-1 USTC 
119393. 
Capital gain implications. Cost-basis of 
property must be allocated between portion 
of property "sold" and portion of property 
"given" to charity on basis of fair market 
value of each. Appreciation allocable to sale 
is subject to capital gains taxation; apprecia-
tion allocable to gift is not IRC §1011(b). 
Caveat: Outright gift of mortgaged property 
is considered a bargain sale. Reg. §l.l0ll-
2(a)(3). 
Treasury requirements Substantiating 
charitable deductions. See Reg. § l.l70A-
1(a)(2). 
Deduction Dates 
A gift is deemed delivered for determining 
valuation and year of deduction. Reg. 
§l.l70A-J(b). 
Securities - If mailed, date of mailing is de-
livery date; if hand delivered to charity, date 
received by charity is delivery date. If secu-
rities delivered to donor's bank or broker 
(as donor 's agent) or to the issuing corpora-
tion (or its agent) instructing corporation to 
reissue in charity's nan1e, delivery date is 
date securities transferred to charity's name 
on corporation's books (date on new stock 
certificate having charity's name). 
Check - U mailed, date of mailing is deliv-
ery date; if hand delivered to charity, date re-
ceived by charity is delivery date. 
Art works and other tangible personal prop-
erty - Date property received by charity is 
delivery date. 
Real Estate -Date charity receives property 
executed deed is delivery date. 
Pledges - Deductible in year fulfilled- not 
when made. IRC §170(a)( l). Satisfying pledge 
with property does not give rise to taxable 
gain or deductible loss. Rev. Rul. S5-410, 
19SS-1 Cll 297. 
Determining fair market value - Gifts of 
securities - When there is market for 
securities on a stock exchange or over the 
counter: Fair market value is mean between 
highest and lowest quoted selling prices on 
date of delivery. Reg. §20.2031-2. 
Mutual fund shares (open-end investment 
companies). Fair market value is redemption 
price ("bid"). Cartwright, U.S. Sup. Ct., 411 
U.S. S46 (1973). 
Closed-end investment company shares: 
Valued the same way as securities traded on a 
stock exchange or over-the-counter. Reg. 
§20.2031-2. 
Real estate, worl<s of art and other property 
not traded on an exchange or over the 
counter - Fair market value is price at 
which the property would change hands be-
tween a willing buyer and a willing seller, 
neither being under any compulsion to buy 
or sell and both having reasonable knowledge 
of relevant facts. Reg. §1.170A-1(c). Deter-
ruined by expert appraisals. Cost of appraisal 
deductible as TRC §212(3) deduction; thus 
percent of adjusted gross income ceiling in-
applicable. Rev. Rul. 67-461, 1967-2 CB 12S. 
For guidelines to be used in making apprais-
als, sec: Rev. Proc. 66-49, 1966-2 CB 1257. 
Services- No charitable deduction for value 
of personal services rendered free for charity. 
Reg. §1.170A-1(g); Rev. Rul. 19S3-162, 1953-2 
CB 127; Rev. Rul. 67-236, 1967-2 CB 103. 
Unreimbursed voltmteer expenses - Deduc-
tible when incurred in rendering services for 
charity. Rev. Rul. SS-4, 19SS-1 CB 291. Op-
tional standard mileage rate of 7¢ a mile for 
unreirnbursed automobile expenses. Rev. 
Proc. 74-24, 1974-2 CB 477 . Ceiling is 20% of 
adjusted gross income, with no five-year car-
ryover. IRC §170(b)(1)(B); IRC §170(d)(1)(A); 
Reg. §1.170A-l(g). Unreimbursed babysitting 
expenses incurred to render volun teer ser-
vices not deductible. Rev. Rul. 73-S97, 1973-2 
CB 69. 
Patron's gifts - Contribution is an10unt 
transferred by donor less value of theatre 
ticket, meal or other privi lege donor receives. 
Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 CB 104. 
Installment obligation -caveat - Gift of 
installment obligation (taxpayer elected on 
sale to pay gains tax in installments under 
IRC §4S3) accelerates remaining deferred 
gain in year of gift. Rev. Rul. SS-1S7, 195S-1 
CB 293. 
Depreciable personal property - Contribu-
tion deduction reduced by what would have 
been taxed as ordinary income (under IRC 
§124S) if property had been sold. IRC 
§170(e)(1)(A). 
Depreciable real property - Contribution 
deduction reduced by what would have been 
taxed as ordinary income (under IRC §1250) 
if property had been sold. IRC §170(e)(1)(A). 
Life Insurance- Donor names charity ben -
eficiary and irrevocably assigns incidents of 
ownership to it. 
Gift of policy on which premiums remain 
to be paid. Income tax deduction is slightly 
above cash surrender value. Reg. §25.2512-
6(a). Continued payment of premiums gives 
donor deduction for annual premiums. Aw-
rcy, 2S TC 643. 
Gift of fully paid-up policy. lncome tax de-
duction is generally replacement cost. Reg. 
§2S.2S12-6(a). 
Endowment policy. Charitable deduction 
for value minus amount which would be 
taxed as ordinary income on a sale. IRC 
§170(e)(1)(A). But see Reg. §l.l70A-4(a). 
Caveat: Donor has ordinary income of differ-
ence between cost and maturity value in year 
charity receives proceeds. Rev. Rul. 69-102. 
1969-1 CB 32; Friedman, 41 TC 428. 
Charitable Remainder Trusts 
Charitable remainder unitrust -Specifies 
that income beneficiary is to receive annual 
payments determined by multiplying a fixed 
percent (which cannot be less than 5%) by 
the net fair market value of the trust assets, 
as detem1ined each year. On death of ben-
eficiary (or survivor beneficiary, if more 
than one) charity gets the remainder. IRC 
§664(dl(2). 
A variation calls for trustee to pay only 
trust income if actual income is less than 
stated percent. Deficiencies in distributions 
(i.e., where trust income is less than stated 
percent) are made up in later years if trust 
income exceeds the stated percent. Another 
variation provides that deficiencies are not to 
be made up. IRC §664(d)(3); Reg. §1.664-
3(a)(1)(i)(b). 
Charitable remainder annuity trust -
Specifics a fixed dollar an10unt (at least 5% 
of initial net fair market value of transferred 
property) which is to be paid annually to in-
come beneficiary for life. On death of ben-
eficiary (or survivor beneficiary, if more 
than one) chari ty gets the remainder. IRC 
§664(d)(1). 
Payments taxed to recipient - for uni -
trusts and annuity trusts amounts paid to the 
recipient retain the character they had in 
trust. Each payment is treated as follows: 
First, as ordinary income to the extent of the 
trust ordinary income for the year and undis-
tributed ordinary income for prior years; Sec-
ond, as capital gain to the extent of the trust 
capital gains for the year and undistributed 
capital gains for prior years; Third, as other 
income (e.g., tax-exempt income) to the ex-
tent of the trust's other income for the year 
and undistributed other income for prior 
years; Fourth, as a tax free distribution of 
principal. IRC §664(b); Reg. §I.664-1(d). 
Unitrusts and annuity trusts are exempt 
from taxation -But a trust is not exempt in 
any year it has income which would be taxa-
ble unrelated business income if trust were 
an exempt organization. IRC §664(c). Pay-
ments to income beneficiary taxed as de-
scribed above. 
Governing instrument requirements - To 
assure charitable deductions and avoid ad-
verse tax consequences, governing instru-
ment must contain specific provisions. See: 
Reg. §1.664-1 through §1.664-3; IRC §508(e); 
IRC §4947(al(2); Rev. Rul. 72-395, 1972-2 CB 
340. 
Income tax. Contribution deduction al-
lowed for value of remainder interest -
compute using Treasury tables. Unitrusts -
IRC §170(f)(2); Reg. §1.664-(3)(c) and §1.664-4; 
IRS Pub. 723B. Annuity trusts - IRC 
§170(f)(2); Reg. §1.664-2(c); Reg. §20.2031-lO; 
IRS Pub. 723A. 
Capital gain - No capital gain incurred on 
t ransfer of appreciated assets to trust. Rev. 
Rul. 55-275, 1955-1 CB 295; Rev. Rul. 60-370, 
1960-2 CB 203. Nor is there capital gain to 
donor on a sale by trust (except as taxable 
under four tier system, above). Exception : 
Gain taxable to donor if trust assets sold and 
invested in tax-exempt securities pursuant to 
express or implied agreement between donor 
and trustees. Rev. Rut. 60-370, 1960-2 CB 
203. 
Estate tax [IRC §205S(c)(2)(A)]. One life 
(donor is beneficiary). Fair market value of 
trust principal at death included in gross es-
tate and then deductible as charitable con-
tribution - resulting in a washout. 
Two life (funded with donor's separate 
property, donor is first beneficiary and 
another is to be survivor beneficiary). Fair 
market value of trust principal at donor's 
death included in gross estate but then fully 
deductible as charitable contribution if sec-
ond beneficiary not surv iving. If second 
beneficiary survives, charitable remainder 
based on survivor's age at donor 's death is 
deductible as charitable contribution. 
Marital deduction - Potential increased 
by 50% of amount of trust principal included 
in gross estate under present law. 
Estate tax niles for charitable remainder 
trusts not meeting unitrust or annuity trust 
requirements - P.L. 91-172, §201(b). Estate 
tax charitable deduction will be allowed for 
the classic charitable remainder trust (the 
type created before unitrusts and annuity 
trusts were authorized by law): 
I. If irrevocable inter vivos trust was created 
before October lO, 1969. 
2. If charitable remainder trust was created 
by Will executed before October 10, 1969 
and testator died before October 9, 1972 
without having modified Will. 
Caveat: Wills of living donors containing 
charitable remainder trusts should be re-
viewed now. 
3. If Will containing charitable remainder 
trust drawn before October lO, 1969 and 
cannot be modified thereafter because of 
individual's mental disability. 
See also Rev. Proc. 74-6, 1974-1 CB 417, for 
agreement by executor not to exercise broad 
administrative and investment powers to 
detriment of charitable remainderman. 
Nonqualified charitable remainder trusts 
created inter vivos or in wills after July 31, 
1969 and before December 31, 1977 will qual-
ify for estate tax charitable deduction if re-
fomled or amended to meet unitrust, annuity 
trust or pooled income fund trust require-
ments by December 31, 1977 (or if judicial 
proceeding begun by December 31, 1977, 
tmst is amended to conform to new re-
quirement within 30 days after final court 
determination). lRC §2055(e)(3). 
Gift tax [lRC §2522(c)(2)(A)l - Value of the 
charitable remainder is fully deductib le and 
thus charitable gift is immune from gift tax. 
Where there is a life interest other than 
donor's, there is a gift by donor to non-
charity beneficiary of value of beneficiary's 
life interest. Value of that gift depends on 
type of property ownership and when other 
beneficiary's payments are to begin. It is 
often possible to draw trust instrument so 
that a gift is not deemed made to non-charity 
beneficiary by reserving right by will only to 
revoke life beneficiary's interest. Reg. 
§1.664-3(a)(4). Rev. Rul. 74-149, 1974-1 CB 
157. 
Charitable Gift Annuities -Donor transfers 
money or property to charity in exchange for 
its promise to pay fixed amount annually to 
donor (and ;1 survivor, if desired) for life. 
Transfer is part !,rift and part purchase of an 
annuity. 
Income tax- Charitable deduction for ex-
cess of amount transferred over what it 
would cost to purchase comparable annuity 
from commercial insurance company, as de-
termined by Treasury tables. Rev. Rul. 72-
438, 1972-2 CB 38. 
How beneficiary taxed- Annuitant's return 
is part capital and part interest; only interest 
portion taxable. 
Determining amount received tax-free-
the exclusion ratio. 
investment in contract 
[determined under 
Rev. Rul. 72-438 (supralJ 
expected return 
f determined using tables in Reg. § 1. 72-9 J 
Capital gains implications when appreciated 
property used to fund gift annuity- there is 
capital gain when gift annuity is funded with 
appreciated property. An10unt of gain is 
smaller, however, than gain would be on sale 
of appreciated property - instead of transfer 
for charitable gift annuity. Furthermore, gain 
is not all reportable in year of transfer for gift 
annuity - as it would be on a sale of prop-
erty. Gain is reported ratably over annui-
tant's life expectancy when annuity is non-
assignable and donor is sole annuitant or 
one of the annuitants in a two-life annuity. 
Reg. §l.l01 1-2(a)(4); l.l0ll-2(c) Example 8. 
Estate tax - One life (donor is annuitant). 
None. IRC §2039. 1\vo lives (hmded with 
donor's separate property; donor is first an-
nuitant and second individual is to be sur-
vivor annuitant). Jf second annuitant not liv-
ing on donor 's death, no amount included in 
donor's gross estate. Jf second annuitant sur-
vives, included in donor 's gross estate is 
value of annuity paying same amount to sur-
vivor annuitant (at survivor's age at donor's 
death ) as donor received during life. IRC 
§2039(b). 
Any estate tax paid by donor's estate at-
tributable to annuity deductible by survivor 
over his life expectancy. Reg. §1.69l(d)-1. 
Martial deduction. Annuity qualifies to ex-
tent included in gross estate (only if created 
inter vivos, not by Will). Reg. §20.2056(b)-
(l)(g). 
Federal gift tax l1RC §2522(c)(2)(A)l - One 
life (donor is aJmuitant). No gift tax. Two life 
(funded with donor 's separate property, donor 
is first annuitant and another is to be sur-
vivor annuitant). Gift to survivor of future 
and terminable interest; hence no annual 
exclusion or marital deduction. Suggestion -
Gift tax implications for survivor's interest 
can be avoided by donor reserving right to 
revoke survivor 's annuity by his Will. Reg. 
§25.2511-2(c). 
Deferred Payment Annuity - (payments 
begin more than one year after gift). Income 
tax charitable deduction. Rev. Rul. 72-438, 
1972-2 CB 38. Exclusion ratio to be deter-
mined only at time payments begin; estate 
and gift tax implications same as above for 
"immediate" annuities (payments begin 
within one year of gift.) 
Who are the Advocates? 
Alumni, faculty, friends, parents, 
corporations and foundations do-
nate annually to The Advocates! 
The Advocates, established in 
1961, is the Law School 's annual 
support group. It was originally de-
voted solely to providing schol-
arships for students in need of fi-
nancial assistance. In later years, 
however, The Advocates expanded 
the use of funds raised to include 
such necessary items as assisting 
with the development of a com-
prehensive legal curriculum, at-
tracting and retaining outstanding 
faculty, acquiring needed books and 
equipmen t for the Law Library, and 
providing academic research assis-
tance. 
Why the Advocates? 
Loyola Law School is a private law 
school and therefore requires the fi-
nancial su pport of concerned ben-
efactors if it is to maintain its po-
sition as a leader in legal education. 
We must look to alumni and friends 
for support. For 1977-78, the Law 
School 's operating and salary budget 
is $4.2 million. Tuition, which pro-
vides the major portion (8 7%) of the 
Law School's income, will never 
provide 100 percent of the budget's 
income unless increased to a pro-
hibitive level. Therefore, the differ-
ence must be made up from other 
income sources, including annual 
gifts. 
To illustrate the in1portance of 
gifts through The Advocates, if 50 
percent of the Law School's 4,200 
alunmi each contributed $50, that 
would total $105,000, almost four 
times the amount our alunmi do-
nated last year. Secondly, the per-
centage of participation is impor-
tant. Other potential donors like 
foundations and corporations have 
progran1s to support higher educa-
tion, but they want to know that 
the principal beneficiaries of the 
Law School's efforts - its alumni 
- support their professional school. 
If 50 percent of the alumni feel 
compelled to make a gift through 
The Advocates, the chances are 
other non-alumni will respond in 
kind and generally contribute at the 
level requested. This type of sup-
port is vital to Loyola Law School's 
future well-being. 
What Benefits 
Accrue to Me? 
• The personal satisfaction of help-
ing to provide a quality legal edu-
cation for today's studen ts. 
• Contributing to the already fine 
and growing reputation for excel-
lence in legal education that 
Loyola Law School represents . 
. Knowledge that my gift will help 
to mal<e it possible for the Law 
School t o receive additional con-
tributions. 
. An investmen t which will con-
tinue to pay you professional divi-
dends in the future. 
• Your gift is tax deductible. 
In recognition of your annual gift, 
you will receive an Advocates 
m embership card which also iden-
tifies the level of financial support, 
i.e., Donovan Fellow ($ 1,000), Dib-
ble Fellow ($500-$999), Cook Fel-
low ($250-$499), and Advocat e Fel-
low ($100-$249). 
We look to you! If you have not 
yet contributed this year, we have 
provided an attached envelope for 
your convenience. Please consider 
using it to support your alma mater. 
Berman Lecture 
Professor Harold J. Berman of Harvard 
Law School presented a lecture on 
February 16 at Loyola Law School on 
the topic of "Human Rights in the 
Soviety Union: Some Current An1erican 
Fallacies.', Some 100 persons attended 
the informative discussion which was 
sponsored by the school as part of a guest 
lecture program. Berman is a noted 
scholar and authority on International 
Law and the Soviet Union. He earned 
his LL.B. from Yale in 1947, graduated 
from the London School of Economics 
and Political Science, served on the 
executive committee of the Russian 
Research Center since 1952, has been a 
visiting scholar at the Institute for State 
and Law in Moscow, a Rockefeller 
Fellow for the study of East-West Trade, 
a Ford Fellow for the study of Soviet 
Law, and is currently an Ames Professor 
at Harvard Law School. 
300 Year Old Lawbook 
Law for the Ages - This 300-year-old 
law book was recently donated to 
Loyola Law School by Mrs. Richard M. 
Gleason of Los Angeles [left). Looking 
over the rare book are Dean Frederick f. 
Lower, Jr. and Law Librarian Frederica 
M. Sedgewick. The book is titled 
"Officina Breviun1," sub-titled "Select 
and Approved Forms of Judicial Writs, 
and other Process with their Retorns 
and Entries in the Court of Common 
Pleas at Westminster. As Also Special 
Pleadings to Writs of Scire Facias." The 
book was printed in 1679 in London and 
contains 438 pages of Latin text; the 
original tan calf covers have been 
detached, but overall condition is very 
good. Mrs. Gleason is an interested 
friend of Loyola Law School who wished 
to donate this family heirloon1 because, 
she said, "Sharing is what life is all 
about." The early history of this book, 
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how it crossed the Atlantic from 
England, and its possible contributions 
to American jurisprudence are 
unknown. However, Mrs. Gleason's 
grandfather, David R. Woods, inherited 
the book in 1880 and brought his 
treasured library from New Brighton, 
Pennsylvania, to California at the turn 
of the century. The book will be placed 
on display in the Loyola Law School 
library. 
Casino Night 
Jackpot - Professor Steven Hirschtick 
served as one of the Blackjack dealers at 
the annual "Casino Night" sponsored 
by the Loyola Law Students Partners 
Association held January 14 at the 
University's Westchester campus. All 
proceeds from the event, which features 
modified Las Vegas style gambling and 
entertainment, go to a scholarship fund 
for a married law student. 
11 
Alumni Directory 
Loyola Law School is currently planning the publication of a Law 
Alumni Directory. This will be the first time such a directory has been 
compiled, and the Alumni Relations Office is seeking preliminary 
information for its files. To insure that we have your correct address 
and professional information, please fill out the sheet below and return 
it to us as soon as possible in the enclosed business reply envelope. 
Since the value of any Alumni Directory is the publication of correct 
and updated information, your cooperation and prompt response will be 
greatly appreciated. 
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Last Name First Name Middle Initial Class Year 
Professional Occupation/Current Business Title Specialization 
Firm Name 
Business Address City State Zip Telephone 
Residence Address City State Zip Telephone 
I prefer receiving alumni mail at n1y 0 Business 0 Residence 
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Board of 
Governors Committees 
The Loyola Law School Alumni 
Association Board of Governors has 
formed eight standing con1mittees and 
one ad hoc comn1ittee pursuant to their 
responsibilities as outlined in the 
By~Laws adopted on September 15, 
1977, according to President Laurence 
G. Preble '68. 
The 19-nlenlber Board has organized 
the following conm1ittees: Alun1ni 
Chapters, Career Planning and 
Placement, Special Events, Awards, 
Class Correspondent, Law Review, 
Advocates, and Class Reunion. The ad 
hoc Nominating Con1mittee was also 
recently forn1ed. 
Comn1ittees which are now active 
include the Alumni Chapters 
Committee, chaired by Vincent W. 
Thorpe '59, which is responsible for 
assisting the Law School Development 
Office in establishing and supporting 
the 18 Alunmi Chapters in California 
and assuring that each remains active 
and effective; the Career Planning and 
Placen1ent Committee, headed by Alvin 
N. Loskan1p '68, assists the Placement 
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Director in helping students and alumni 
identify and achieve career 
opportunities and goals. This 
committee is also responsible for 
conducting a Career Planning Seminar 
held each Fall at the Law School. 
The Special Events Comn1ittee 
coordinates the annual reception for 
those graduates who pass the California 
Bar Exan1ination, an alumni luncheon 
at the State Bar Convention, a reception 
for third and fourth-year students, and 
the Annual AlumnifAdvocates Dinner 
Dance. This committee is chaired by 
David M. Finkle '67. The Awards 
Committee is responsible for selecting 
individuals to receive the Alumni 
Association Award at commencement, 
honorees at the Annual Alun1ni Dinnet; 
and other citations given by the Alumni 
Association. Sheldon I. Lodn1er '70 is 
chairn1an of this committee. 
The following committees are in 
various stages of formation at this tin1e. 
The Clas~ Correspondent Committee 
assists the Developn1ent Office in 
gathering alumni news for publication 
in the Loyola Lawyer. The Law Review 
Comn1ittee is responsible for assisting 
and supporting the Loyola of Los 
Angeles Law Review. The Advocates 
Committee has the responsibility for 
insuring the adequate financial support 
for the Law School, and the Class 
Reunion Committee assists the 
Developn1ent Office in planning annual 
reunions for the 10, 20, 25, 35 and 
50-year classes. 
The Nominating Conm1ittee reviews 
and recomn1ends candidates for 
non1ination to the Board of Governors, 
fills any Board vacancies, and is 
responsible for organizing and 
conducting the election process. 
All active members of the Alumni 
Association are eligible to serve on 
Board Committees. 
For further information about the 
Board of Governors of the Loyola Law 
School Alunmi Association, contact 
Pamela Gleason, Alun1ni Relations 
Office at (213) 642-3549. 
Board of 
Governors Elections 
Elections for positions on the 1978-79 
Board of Governors of the Loyola Law 
School Alumni Association are slated 
for June. If you are interested in being 
nominated for election to the Board, it 
is necessary to submit a nominating 
petition stating your intent and signed 
by at least 20 n1embers of the Alumni 
Association. Nominations will be 
accepted through the June 1, 1978 
deadline by mailing them to Mr. 
Laurence G. Preble, c/o Loyola Law 
School, Alumni Relations Office, 1440 
West Ninth Street, Los Angeles, 
California 90015. 
There will be five open positions on 
the Board to be filled for a two-year 
term of office beginning on July l, 1978, 
as provided in the By-Laws. All 
men1bers of the Alun1ni Association are 
eligible for nomination. 
General alumni election ballots will 
be mailed on June 15. Please return 
them imn1ediately since final 
tabulations will be held on June 30. 
Official results will be announced in the 
September issue of Loyola LawyeL 
Serving on the Board of Governors 
Nominating Con1mittee are chairn1an 
Lawrence W. Crispo '61, Thomas E. 
Garcin '52, Sheldon I. Lodmer '70, Alvin 
N. Loskamp '68, Laurence G. Preble '68, 
and Vincent W Thorpe '59. 
For further information on the 
elections, contact Pamela Gleason, 
Alumni Relations office at (213) 
642-3549. 
Board of 
Visitors Hold 
First Meeting 
Board Meeting - The first general meeting 
and orientation of the Loyola Law School 
Board of Visitors included a tour of the 
campus, presentations by staff, and 
organizational discussions. 
In January, the Visitors n1et at the Law 
School for a half-day orientation session 
and first meeting of the full Board. 
The orientation progran1 included a 
tour of the campus, and a series of 
presentations by members of the faculty 
and administration to better acquaint 
the Board of Visitors with Loyola. 
Preliminary plans to in1prove the Law 
School's facilities and continue its 
position as a leader in legal education 
were also unveiled. 
Following the afternoon progran1, the 
Visitors met at Times Mirror Square for 
cocktails and dinner. Joining Board 
members at Times Mirror were Bernard 
J. Bannan, chairman of the University's 
Board of Trustees, Rev. Donald P. 
Merrifield, S.J., president of Loyola 
Marymount University, Rev. Charles S. 
Casassa, S.J., University chancellor, and 
Charles R. Redmond '7 4, assistant to 
the president, Times Mirror 
Corporation. 
Since the last issue of Loyola Lawyer, 
several individuals have joined the 
Board of Visitors. They include: 
John E. Anderson '50, a partner in the 
Los Angeles and Santa Ana law firn1 of 
Kindel & Anderson. He received his 
bachelor 1s degree from the University of 
California, Los Angeles1 and a master's 
in business administration degree fron1 
Harvard Business School. 
Anderson serves on several corporate 
and civic boards1 including Claremont 
Men's College (vice chairman), Saint 
John1s Hospital and Health Center 
Foundation (president), and the Young 
Men's Christian Association (YMCA) 
Metropolitan Los Angeles. 
Joseph A. Ball, partner in the Los 
Angeles law firn1 of Ball, Hunt, Hart1 
Brown & Baerwitz, earned his law 
degree at the University of Southern 
California after completing his 
undergraduate studies at Creighton 
University (Omaha). 
Ball is a past president of the State Bar 
of California and the Long Beach- Bar 
Association. He is a n1ember and past 
president of the American College of 
Trial Lawyers and the International 
Academy of Trial Lawyers. Ball was 
counsel to the Comn1ission to 
Investigate the Assassination of 
President Kennedy. 
William H. Doheny1 Jt. '75 received his 
bachelor Is degree from Stanford 
University. In 1976 Doheny joined the 
investment firm of Scudder, Stevens & 
Clark (New York) and is an investment 
counselor for the company's Los 
Angeles office. 
M. Louise Eason is a senior vice 
president, director, and a member of the 
executive con1mittee of California 
Federal Savings and Loan Association 
(Los Angeles). 
Mrs. Eason is on the advisory board of 
the executive women1S division of the 
National Savings and Loan League. She 
is one of the founders of Los Angeles 
Beautiful and remains active in this 
organization. 
Milton Feinerman '56 is president and 
chief executive officer of Westdale 
Savings and Loan Association (Los 
Angeles). He received his bachelor's 
degree from the University of 
California, Los Angeles. 
Feinerman is a director and member 
of the executive committee of the 
California Savings and Loan League, and 
a member of the legislative con1mittee 
of the U.S. Savings and Loan League. 
Thomas V. Girardi 164 is a partner in the 
law firm of Girardi, Keese & Crane (Los 
Angeles). He earned his bachelor's 
degree from Loyola University (Los 
Angeles) and a master 1s degree from 
New York University Law School. 
Girardi is a member of the part-tin1e 
faculty at Loyola Law School and a 
lecturer for the Continuing Education of 
the Bar in the area of trial procedure and 
evidence. 
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William T. Huston is a graduate of the 
University of Notre Dame Law SchooL 
Following a brief period with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Huston 
began the practice of law in 1954. Since 
1963, he has been president and chief 
executive of Watson Land Company and 
Watson Industrial Properties (Los 
Angeles). 
Huston's civic activities include 
n1embership in the Los Angeles Area 
and Long Beach chambers of commerce. 
James H. Kindel, Jr. '40 is a partner in 
the Los Angeles and Santa Ana law firm 
of Kindel & Anderson. He received his 
bachelor's degree from the University of 
California, Los Angeles. 
Kindel is a former partner (retired) 
with the accounting firm of Coopers & 
Lybrand (New York) and he is currently 
general counsel for The UCLA 
Foundation. 
Mariana R. Pfaelzer is a senior partner 
in the Century City law firm of Wyman, 
Bautzer, Rothman & Kuchel. She earned 
her bachelor's degree from the 
University of California, Santa Barbara, 
and her law degree from the University 
of California, Los Angeles. 
Mariana's professional, business, and 
civic activities include serving as 
chairman of the State Bar of California's 
Committee on Professional Ethics and 
Special Committee on Junveile Justice. 
She is a director and a member of the 
executive committee of TICOR, and is 
president of the Board of Police 
Commissioners for Los Angeles. 
Robert W. Prescott '39, a member of the 
Board since October 1977, succumbed 
to cancer on March 3. He was president 
and chief executive officer of Flying 
Tiger Line, and chaim1an of Tiger 
International (Los Angeles). Prescott 
pioneered the air cargo industry in the 
United States when he founded Flying 
Tigers in 1945 as the first airfreight 
carrier. 
During World War II, he participated 
in five major campaigns while serving 
as a flight leader for General Claire Lee 
fohn E. Anderson '50 
Chennault's American Volunteer Group 
in China, popularly known as "The 
Flying Tigers." 
Prescott was a member of the 
Transportation Association of America 
board and the Board of Directors of the 
Air Transport Association. He was also 
active in civic affairs, and served as a 
trustee of the City of Hope. 
Margaret Ann Shaw is an associate of 
the Wallace Jan1ie Resource Group (Los 
Angeles), a public relations firm. In 
foseph A. Ball 
William H. Doheny, fr '75 M. Louise Eason 
Milton Feinerman '56 Thomas V Girardi '64 William T Huston 
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1969, Mrs. Shaw was nan1ed a Los 
Angeles Times Won1an of the Yea:r:, and 
in 1971 received an honorary doctorate 
degree from the University of Redlands 
where she currently serves as a n1ember 
of the Board of Trustees. 
Mrs. Shaw's husband, Leslie, is the 
former postmaster of Los Angeles 
(1963-69), and he is currently vice 
president and director of community 
affairs for Great Western Financial 
Corporation (Beverly Hills). 
Sheila Prell Sonenshine '70 is a partner 
in the Newport Beach law firm of 
Sonenshine & Armstrong. She received 
her bachelor's degree from the 
University of California, Los Angeles. 
Mrs. Sonenshine's professional and 
civic activities include being the 
founder and chairperson of the Women 
and Individual Rights Section of the 
Orange County Bar Association, and a 
member of the Judiciary and Ethics 
committees of the Orange County Bar 
Association. In 1976, she was appointed 
by Governor Brown to the Board of 
Directors for the 32nd District 
Agricultural Association. 
Martin Stone '51 is chairman of 
Monogram Industries (Santa Monica). 
He earned his bachelor's degree from 
the University of California, Los 
Angeles, and a n1aster's degree from the 
University of Southern California Law 
School. In 1969, Loyola awarded Stone 
an honorary Doctor of Laws degree. 
Stone's community activities include 
serving as president of the Los Angeles 
Urban Coalition and as a member of the 
National Urban Coalition. He is a 
former n1en1ber of the Board of Trustees 
of Loyola Marymount University. 
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The California Uniform 
Determinate Sentencing Act: 
The Problem of Vagueness 
by Gerald F. Uelmen 
Responding to a chorus of criticism that 
the unbridled discretion placed in the 
hands of parole boards resulted in 
unacceptable disparities in the 
punishment meted out to similar 
offenders for similar crin1es, the 
California legislature enacted the 
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 
1976. By presenting a narrow range of 
choices to the sentencing judge, and 
creating explicit factual guidelines to 
control these choices, subject to 
appellate review, the Act promises 
greater consistency in sentencing 
results. 
The California Act confronts a judge 
who is sentencing a defendant to prison 
with three choices: a middle term, a 
lesser term when circumstances of 
mitigation are shown, and a greater 
term when circumstances of 
aggravation are shown. Aggravating and 
n1itigating circumstances are described 
in Rules adopted by the California 
Judicial Council. The judge must 
support his choice of the term with a 
statement of reasons, and that choice 
may be challenged on appeal by the 
defendant. To illustrate the effect of 
these changes, we can compare a 
defendant convicted of armed robbery 
before and after the new law. Before the 
new law took effect, robbery was 
punishable by an indeterminate 
sentence of one year to life in prison; 
but if the jnry found the defendant was 
armed with a dangerous or deadly 
weapon, the possible sentence was five 
years to life in prison. The defendant 
convicted of ordinary robbery would be 
eligible for parole after serving one year, 
but a defendant convicted of armed 
robbery would have to serve one-third of 
the five year minimun1 before being 
eligible for release on parole. The actual 
parole release date and length of the 
parole tern1 would be determined by the 
Adult Authority based on a subjective 
judgement of the defendant's progress 
toward rehabilitation. Under the new 
law; armed robbery is no longer defined 
as a separate crime. Robbery is 
punishable by two, three or four years. 
Ordinarily, the three year term would be 
in1posed, unless aggravating 
circumstances are shown, to justify the 
four year term, or mitigating 
circun1stances are shown, to justify the 
two year tern1. Among the aggravating 
circumstances which would justify the 
four year term would be proof that the 
defendant was armed. Alternatively, the 
fact that the defendant was armed could 
be pleaded and proven as enhancement, 
which would also add one year to the 
sentence to be served. The defendant 
would not be released on parole until he 
served two-thirds of the sentence, and 
the parole term is ordinarily limited to 
one year. 
While these reforms n1ay correct the 
most serious disparities in sentences, 
they inject procedural changes into the 
sentencing process which raise 
substantial issues of constitutional 
magnitude. If the sentencing judge is 
required to make new factual findings 
to justify the sentence, a whole panoply 
of procedural rights within the rubric of 
due process n1ay apply, including the 
right to standards which are not vague, 
adequate notice, confrontation and cross 
examination of witnesses, the right to 
exclude unlawfully obtained evidence, 
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, a jury 
trial, explicit findings and appellate 
review. The magnitude of the in1pact 
such changes could have upon the 
crin1inal justice system is rather stark; 
while only 10-15 percent of California 
defendants now avail themselves of all 
of the procedural rights of a trial, all 
convicted defendants are ultimately 
subject to the sentencing process, 
including the 85-90% who plead guilty. 
Even if the full panoply of due process 
rights is limited to the 28% of felony 
defendants who receive prison or jail 
sentences, we face the possibility of a 
-
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vast multiplication of the commitment 
of judicial resources to what is now a 
rather routine and expeditious process. 
As the law has evolved thus far;. two 
basic models of the sentencing process 
have emerged. The traditional model, 
which we can label the discretion 
model, gives the judge relatively free 
access to information for sentencing. In 
Williams " New York, 337 U.S. 241, 
(1948), upholding the imposition of a 
death penalty on the basis of 
inforn1ation contained in a presentence 
report to the judge, the Court reasoned 
that "modem concepts individualizing 
punishment have made it all the more 
necessary that a sentencing judge not be 
denied an opportunity to obtain 
pertinent information by a requirement 
of rigid adherence to restrictive rules of 
evidence properly applicable to the 
trial. 11 The Court did not hold that the 
sentencing process is immune from due 
process scrutiny, however; noting that 
the defendant was represented by 
counsel, and was not deprived of an 
opportunity to present evidence. Only 
the rights to reasonable notice of the 
charges and an opportunity to examine 
adverse witnesses were explicitly 
rejected. 
The second model1 which we will call 
the enhancement model1 finds its 
paradigm in Specht v. Patterson, 386 
U.S. 605, (1967). There the Court 
confronted a proceeding whereby a 
defendant convicted of indecent 
liberties1 carrying a maximum sentence 
of ten years, could be found to be a 
utlueat of bodily harm to the public" or 
a 11habitual offender 11 and given an 
indetern1inate sentence of one day to 
life. The finding was made on the basis 
of a psychiatric report submitted to the 
Court. Noting that the finding 
defendant was a public threat or 
habitual offender was a new finding of 
fact that was not an ingredient of the 
offense charged1 the Court found the 
situation "radically different 11 from 
Williams v. New York. This difference 
entirled the defendant to the "full 
panoply of the relevant protections 
which due process guarantees in state 
criminal proceedings1 11 including 
11that 
he be present with counsel1 have an 
opportunity to be heard1 be confronted 
with witnesses against him1 have the 
right to cross-examine1 and to offer 
evidence of his own. And there must 
be findings adequate to make 
meaningful any appeal that is allowed." 
The absence of a right to proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt and a jury trial from 
this catalogue of rights may simply be 
explained by noting that the cases 
holding these rights to be incorporated 
within "due process11 had not yet been 
decided. 
The essential difference between the 
discretion model and the enhancement 
model is the existence of an explicit 
factual predicate for punishment which 
was not an essential dement of the 
underlying crime. But these two models 
are not mutually exclusivei it would be 
more accurate to characterize them as 
representing opposite ends of a 
spectrum. Due process is no longer the 
"all or none' proposition suggested in 
Specht v: Patterson. As stated by the 
Court more recently in Morrissey v. 
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1971): 
110nce it is determined that due 
process applies1 the question 
remains what process is due. It 
has been said so often by this 
Court and others as not to require 
citation of authority that due 
process is flexible and calls for 
such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands. 11 
The purpose of this paper will be to 
review the major procedural protections 
encompassed within due process1 and 
consider their applicability to the 
sentencing aggravation procedures 
envisioned in the California statute. We 
will find that these procedures do not 
always fit comfortably into either the 
discretion or the enhancement models. 
But in seeking the answer to 11What 
process is due1
11 the ambiguous terrain 
we tread is not untrod. At least two 
other legislative devices raise a similar 
galaxy of issues. 
First1 we have the death penalty 
statutes enacted in response to the 
holding in Furman v: Georgia that a 
discretionary death penalty violates the 
Eighth Amendment proscription of 
11cruel and unusual punishment. 11 These 
statutes require the finding of specified 
11aggravating circumstances11 to justify 
the imposition of a penalty of death. 
This separate factual finding may take 
these provisions outside the realm of 
Williams " New York. Yet the 
enhancement model of Specht v. 
Patterson might be distinguished1 since 
the aggravating circumstances 
frequently bear a close relationship to 
the underlying crime. Nonetheless1 each 
of the death penalty statutes 
subsequently upheld by the Supreme 
Court provided an explicit list of 
aggravating circumstances1 an 
opportunity to confront and 
cross-examine adverse witnesses, proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt to a jury1 and 
explicit factual findings which were 
subject to appellate review. The statutes 
of Georgia and Texas also provided a 
defendant with advance notice of which 
aggravating circumstances were being 
relied upon. In the one state where the 
judge was vested with discretion to 
disregard the jury1s recommendation 
and impose a death penalty1 the court1 
in Gardner" Florida 97 S. Ct. 1197, 
(1977), held that a presentence 
investigation report relied upon by the 
sentencing judge in such circumstances 
must be disclosed in its entirety to 
defense counsel1 thus limiting its prior 
holding in Williams " New York to 
non-capital cases. 
Similarly, the California death penalty 
law recently enacted over the 
governor 1S veto provides for a full 
panoply of due process protections. A 
death penalty may not be imposed 
unless the jury finds that enumerated 
"special circumstances11 were present, 
and considers other evidence presented 
in aggravation. Not only must the 
special circumstances be alleged and 
specifically found to be true beyond a 
reasonable doubt1 but no additional 
evidence in aggravation can be 
presented unless notice of the evidence 
to be introduced was given to the 
defendant before trial. The special 
circumstances must be proven by 
competent evidence1 subject to the 
same opportunity to confront and 
cross-examine which applies to the 
trial. 
A second parallel is the federal 
Dangerous Special Offender sentencing 
provisions presented in the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970 and the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act of 1970. Both provide a 
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defendant convicted with a n1aximum 
of twenty-five years, upon a finding he 
is a 1'dangerous special offender." The 
statute specifically provides that a 
notice of the prosecutor's intent to rely 
upon the Dangerous Special Offender 
provisions must be filled prior to trial, 
and that the defendant has a right to 
counsel, con1pulsory process, 
cross-examination, specific factual 
findings and appellate review of the 
determination a defendant is a 
Dangerous Special Offender. The statute 
does, however, permit reliance upon 
hearsay in presentence reports, limited 
non-disclosure of such reports, and 
provides that the burden of proof is 
n1erely a preponderance of the evidence, 
to be determined by a judge sitting 
without a jury. This middle position 
was justified by the draftsmen as 
follows: 
"The requirements of Specht v. 
Patterson * * * are inapplicable, 
since no separate charge triggered 
by an independent offenSe is at 
issue. Only circumstances of 
aggravation of the offense for which 
the conviction was obtained are 
before the court." 
As we review each of the procedtrral 
rights in the due process panoply, it will 
be enlightening to compare the judicial 
treatment of these two legislative 
parallels. 
The task of defining circumstances of 
aggravation and n1itigation under the 
California law was delegated by the 
legislature to the California Judicial 
Council, a body con1prised of 
representatives of all California courts. 
The task of drafting reasonably detailed 
and explicit standards is a formidable 
one, perhaps best done by an 
adn1inistrative body. Whether that 
adn1inistrative body should be a judicial 
one, however, raises an intriguing 
question of separation of powers, since 
the constitutionality of the standards 
adopted will ultimately be resolved by 
the Courts. 
The constitutional issues raised by 
the forn1ulation of these standards are 
serious ones. The right to explicit 
definitions which are not vague is an 
essential of due process of law. Two 
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rationales support this doctrine of 
vagueness: the lack of fair notice of 
potential defendants, and the danger of 
discriminatory application where the 
law is vague. While both rationales 
apply with greatest force to the 
definition of the crin1e itself, one cannot 
sin1ply dismiss the vagueness doctrine 
as inapplicable to sentencing 
enhancement provisions. This n1uch is 
now abundantly clear from the Supreme 
Court opinions considering the 
constitutionality of statutes defining 
the aggravating circun1stances under 
which the death penalty may be 
imposed. The precision with which 
those circumstances were defined was 
of a central concern to the Court. In 
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, (1976), 
for example, the Court carefully 
examined each of ten categories of 
aggravating circumstances in the 
Georgia statute in terms of vagueness or 
overbreadth. The Court noted with 
approval that the Georgia Supreme 
Court, in Arnold v. State, 224 S.E.2d 386 
(1976), had already declared one 
statutory ground for capital punishment 
was unconstitutionally vague, and had 
narrowly construed other grounds. 
The Arnold opinion is instructive for 
our purposes. The Georgia Supren1e 
Court was confronted with a defendant 
sentenced to death upon the jury's 
finding of one aggravated circumstance: 
11The offense * * * was con1mited by a 
person * * * who has a substantial 
history of serious assaultive criminal 
convictions." Citing Grayned v. City of 
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104(1972), the court 
noted that 11Whenever a statute leaves 
too much roon1 for personal whim and 
subjective decision-making without a 
readily ascertainable standard of 
minimal objective guidelines for its 
application it cannot withstand 
constitutional scrutiny." Applying this 
standard, the court found the term 
"substantial history" unconstitutionally 
vague. 
The conclusion that the vagueness 
doctrine applies to sentence 
enhancement provisions does not, of 
course, n1ean that it applies with the 
same force as the doctrine is applied to 
definition of crime. The doctrine has 
always been applied with varying 
strictness, depending upon the context. 
The strictest application has always 
been reserved for cases where first 
an1endment liberties were at stake. 
Similarly, a higher standard of strictness 
is recognized where the statute defines 
the availability of capital punishment. 
At the other end of the spectrum are 
cases suggesting greater leeway with 
respecting to 11regulatory statutes 
governing business activities." This 
variable standard is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's interpretation of the 
standards of procedural due process. 
Thus, the first step in applying the 
constitutional test of vagueness to 
definitions of aggravating circumstances 
is to ascertain the extent of aggravation 
permitted. The extent of aggravation 
should not, however, be measured in 
purely quantitative terms: the real issue 
is one of proportion. For example, the 
aggravation of a two-year sentence to a 
three-year sentence under the California 
law pern1its a 50% increase in the 
punishment being meted outi at the 
other end of the spectrum, adding one 
year to a six-year sentence is an increase 
of less than 17%. The subtlety of this 
distinction was not lost on the 
draftsn1en of the Dangerous Special 
Offender provision in the Organized 
Crime Control Act of 1970. The 
increased sentence permitted upon a 
finding that the defendant is a 
dangerous special offender is limited to 
a term 11not disproportionate in severity 
to the maxin1um term otherwise 
authorized by law." Apparently, this 
lin1itation was intended as an end-run 
around Specht v. Patterson, which held 
that the full panoply of the relevant 
protection which due process 
guarantees in state criminal procedures 
applied at the sentencing of a habitual 
offender under the Colorado Sex 
Offenders Act. The proportionality 
limitation was designed to insure that 
the increased sentence did not represent 
a penalty for a different crime. At least 
one court was persuaded by this 
argument, although it contradicts rather 
specific language in Specht: 
"The Sex Offenders Act does not 
make the commission of a specified 
crime the basis for sentencing. It 
makes one conviction the basis for 
commencing another proceeding 
under another act to determine 
whether a person constitutes a 
threat of bodily harm to the public, 
or is an habitual offender and 
mentally ill. This is a new finding 
of fact that was not an ingredient of 
the offense charged. 11 id at 608. 
A persuasive argument can be made 
that, even if Specht is limited to a 
separate offense, whether the 
aggravating circumstance states a 
separate offense should be determined 
by a comparison of the nature of the 
aggravating circumstance and the 
nature of the offense, rather than 
looking to the extent of aggravation 
permitted. Using this standard, it is 
clear that many of the aggravating 
circumstances specified in Rule 421 
adopted by the California Judicial 
Council do state a separate offense, at 
least to the same extent the Colorado 
Sex Offender Act did. A sentence can be 
aggravated if the defendant "has engaged 
in a pattern of violent conduct," if he 
has 11numerous" prior convictions, or if 
he threatened witnesses or suborned 
perjury. 
The test of proportionality remains a 
more significant part of the equation, 
however. Whether the aggravating 
circumstance is characterized as a 
separate offense or not can quickly 
engage us in a label game. The real 
focus of our inquiry should be what's at 
stake for the defendant. Applying this 
test, we can see that the California 
approach of broadly defining aggravating 
circumstances across the board, to be 
applied to all crimes and all sentencing 
ranges, may create difficulties. 
Although the definitions may be precise 
enough in one context, they n1ay not in 
anotheL 
The second step in our vagueness 
analysis should be to ascertain the 
extent of free play in the definition of 
aggravating circumstances, to insure 
that prosecutors and judges are held to 
ascertainable standards in utilizing 
them. When we confront an aggravating 
circumstance which is so broad and 
amorphous it could be plausibly utilized 
against any defendant, we face the very 
danger that the vagueness doctrine is 
designed to prevent: the prosecutor can 
pick and choose the defendants against 
whom the provision will be utilized 
virtually at whim. 
Applying this standard to the 
aggravating circumstances contained in 
Rule 421 promulgated by the California 
Judicial Council, we see some rather 
startling examples of vagueness: 
Under Rule 421 (a) (3 ), circumstances 
in aggravation include that "the victim 
was particularly vulnerable." Every 
victim, of course, is "vulnerable." What 
m.akes a victim "particularly" 
vulnerable is left to our imagination: 
age? sex? physical incapacity? stupidity? 
time of day or night? A prosecutor 
would need little imagination to utilize 
this circumstance in virtually every 
crime that has a victim. 
Rule 421 (a) (8) includes that the 
"planning, sophistication or 
professionalism with which the crin1e 
was carried out, or other facts, indicated 
premeditation." This would seem 
applicable to all but the most 
spontaneous of crimes. 
Rule 421 (a)(ll) allows aggravation if 
"the crime involved a large quantity of 
contraband." Frequent use of this 
provision can be anticipated in drug 
prosecutions. In defining the crime of 
possession with intent to distribute, at 
least one court has held a provision 
authorizing conviction based solely on 
evidence of quantity without specifying 
the amount required was void for 
vagueness. Whether a quantity is large 
should not be left to the varying 
subjective judgements of the 
prosecutors to whon1 the use of this 
provision is entrusted. 
While the California Uniform 
Determinate Sentencing Act may 
achieve greater consistency in 
sentencing, this result cannot be 
attained at the expense of the 
procedural guarantees of due process. It 
appears that attempting to define 
aggravating circumstances for all 
crimes, without particularization, will 
inevitably lead to broad and amorphous 
definitions subject to a constitutional 
challenge as void for vagueness. 
Gerald F Uelman received his B.A. 
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the U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and 
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1This Article is excerpted from 10 Loy. L.A.L. 
Re~ (1977} 
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Faculty Foru01 
Frederick J. Lower, Jr. '64 has been selected as 
a Fellow of the American Bar Foundation. 
Membership is limited to only one-third of 
one percent of the lawyer population in each 
jurisdiction. The By-laws of the Fellows 
provides that selection for membership is in 
recognition of outstanding achievement and 
professional distinction. Dean Lower also 
attended the mid-Winter meeting of the 
American Bar Association held in New 
Orleans, February 8-11, and met with the 
Deans of the American Association of Law 
Schools. Lower was also the keynote speaker 
at the annual meeting of the Superior Court 
Clerks Association in Los Angeles, and was 
appointed to the recently formed executive 
committee of the Committee on Legal 
Education of the California State Bar. 
J. Timothy Philipps has been appointed 
chairman of the ABA's Section of Taxation 
Task Force 01_1 the Model State Tax Court 
Act. He has also recently published an article 
on "Deductibility of Legal Expenses in 
Corporate Readjustments" appearing in The 
Monthly Digest of Tax Articles. 
Owen G. Fiore '61 was a faculty member of 
the American Law Institute-American Bar 
Association Tax Planning for Agriculture 
course, a three-day seminar emphasizing tax 
and estate planning problems of farmers and 
ranchers held in New Orleans. Fiore has 
spoken widely on estate planning for 
agribusiness, and he appeared as a speaker for 
the Montana Tax Institute sponsored by the 
University of Montana Law School in 
December. 
Robert W. Benson submitted a paper at the 
request of the World Intellectual Property 
Organization in Geneva, Switzerland, 
commenting on the WIPO draft treaty for the 
protection of geographical indications on 
wine bottles and other consumer goods. 
Professor Benson also testified in San 
Francisco before a panel of the U.S. Treasury 
Department on the need for reform in the 
matter of deceptive labeling of wines. 
Gerald F. Uelman testified in December 1977 
during hearings conducted by Los Angeles 
County Supervisor Ed Edelman on 
procedures to deal with police shooting 
incidents. He is currently on a six-month 
sabbatical to participate in an 
ABA -sponsored Legal Exchange Program 
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Donovan Dinner -Dean Frederick J. Lower, Jr. '64 (left) and James N. Kenealy, Jr. '52 ex-
change comments on the occasion of the Donovan Fellows Dinner held October 25, 1977 at 
the University's Westchester campus. The Donovan Fellows, named in honor of the late Rev. 
Joseph J. Donovan, S.J., is a major support group of the Law School. Mr. Kenealy and several 
other alumni have recently formed a Steering Committee which is actively working to in-
crease membership in the Donovan Fellows. 
with Scotland Yard to study British drug 
abuse criminal procedures. He also appeared 
on the Criminal Justice panel of the first 
West Coast Conference of Constitutional 
Law. Professor Uelman presented a paper on 
"Constitutional Issues in the Federal 
Sentencing Reform Proposal" now under 
deliberation before the U.S. Senate. 
David C. Tunick spoke on the topic of "Civil 
Procedure" at the annual meeting of the 
Superior Court Clerk's Association held in 
Los Angeles. Professor Tunick also addressed 
the recently formed Committee on Law and 
Technology of the Los Angeles County Bar 
Association on the topic of "Computers and 
the Law." 
Jane Wolf Eldridge and Gerald F. Uelman 
appeared before the California Court of 
Appeals in San Bernardino last November to 
argue on behalf of the California Conference 
on Methadone Progran1s in the case of Reyes 
v. Superior Court, challenging the use of 
child abuse laws to prosecute a pregnant 
mother who is an addict. 
Louise Bereswill, director of Admissions, 
traveled to Hawaii to participate in a panel 
presentation with a consortium of private 
west coast law schools in a joint recruitment 
effort. 
Donald T. Wilson is serving as faculty advisor 
to the upcoming Loyola Law School 
publication International and Comparative 
Law Annual. This is the first such 
publication in Southern California and only 
the 19th in the United States. It is scheduled 
for completion in June 1978. 
Steven Hirschtick spoke on the topic of 
"Forming Professional Corporations" before 
the National Financial Management Seminar 
of the American College of Radiology in Las 
Vegas, February 17, 1978. 
Gideon Kanner was a guest speaker at the 
California Trial Lawyers seminar at the 
recent Bar Convention. 
Lola McAlpin-Grant '66 addressed a 
consumer conference at the Student Trial 
Lawyer's Association in October 1977, spoke 
to a group of Atlantic-Richfield employees in 
November and delivered a speech to a career 
conference sponsored by the Girls State 
Program. Mrs. McAlpin-Grant also gave the 
keynote address to a Goodwill Industries 
meeting last December in Los Angeles on the 
topic of securing civil rights and justice for 
handicapped Americans. 
Missing Persons 
The Alumni Office records indicate that Walter E. Rasmus 1930 John K. Light 19-36 
there is no current address for the alumni David Rothman 1930 Richard S. Pierce 1936 
listed below. If you know the whereabouts of Lewis W. Andrews, Jr. 1931 Han. Paul S. McCormick 1937 
anyone on this list of "lost alunmi," please Francis E. Carter 1931 Arnold Borenstein 1938 
call the Alumni Office: telephone (213) Helen M. Cassidy 1931 Rudolf Maslach 1938 
642-3549 or drop us a note; Jerome C. Dolan 1931 Robert A. Millikan 1938 
Alunmi Office Ethel McCarthy 1931 A. Donald McAlpine 1939 
Loyola Law School Helen C. Mittelman 1931 John W. McElheney 1939 
1440 West Ninth Street Paul D. O'Neil 1931 Douglas L. Barnes 1940 
Los Angeles, California 90015 John r. Sabate 1931 John F. Bums 1940 
Joseph B. del Valle 1932 Franklin G. Campbell 1940 
The list will be continued in forthcoming Joseph Doherty 1932 John R. Morris 1940 
issues of the Loyola Lawyer. Elmer P. Hardenbergh 1932 George R. Stene 1940 
Saied N. Karam 1932 Frank J. Barry 1941 
Francis J. Bird 1926 George R. Miller 1932 Ben M. Grimes 1941 
Frank J. McCarthy 1926 Edward A. O'Connor 1932 Leslie M. Hershman 1941 
Harold V. Daley 1927 Walter E. Sourlock 1932 Robert A. Smith 1941 
Charles E. Derochie 1927 Fred E. Subith 1932 Edwin Greenberg 1942 
Carroll T. Donovan 1927 Reginald F. Walker 1932 Thomas D. Griffith 1943 
Maurice A. Gallician 1927 Truman B. Gilbert 1933 Kenneth A. Murphy 1944 
John J. Gorman 1927 Malcolm Hart 1933 Arnold Colt 1947 
Francis J. McDevitt 1927 Paul S. Mahan 1933 George C. Goldman 1949 
James T. Montgomery 1927 James J. McNulty 1933 William P. James 1949 
Theodore W. Nosek 1927 David J. O'Leary 1933 William D. McGarry 1949 
Walter E. Rankin 1927 Frank M. Rau 1933 Robert T. Whitman 1949 
Jose A. Regalado 1927 Carlos A. Riveroll 1933 Verne L. Cline, Jr. 1950 
Laurence J. Stock 1927 James L. Woodward 1933 Walter I. Colby 1950 
Mariano Alcocer 1928 Charles S. Barrett 1934 I. F. Fiori 1950 
William Connors 1928 Herbert C. Cooke 1934 Stanley H. Shaw 1950 
John J. Mactigue 1928 Louis J. Petritz 1934 Robert G. Helm 1951 
Maurice J. O'Brien 1928 Donald M. Bane 1935 James D. Littlejohn 1951 
Charles T. Schiros 1928 Joseph E. Donkin 1935 John M. Marshall 1951 
Lorraine L. Sylvaine 1928 Richard A. Haley 1935 Frank X. Ball 1953 
Jose M. Villella 1928 Gordon B. Hislop 1935 Richard E. Stewart 1953 
Charles 0. Erbaugh 1930 Meyer T. Levy 1935 Maripaul Salmon Baier 1955 
Laurence S. Harris 1930 Dennie E. McAughan 1935 Bruce Buchanan 1955 
James D. Power 1930 Charles W. Peckham 1935 Joseph J. Armoush 1956 
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